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Nowadays the First Amendment is the First Refuge of Scoun-
drels.2
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of speech is not absolute. With the possible exception
of Associate Justice Hugo Black,3 the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States have noted frequently that freedom
of speech does not protect an unlimited class of speech-related
activities.' Perhaps most famously, Justice Holmes explained
that "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a
panic."5 Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has sus-
tained, against free speech objections, civil liability sounding in
tort and contract, and upheld regulations prohibiting fraud,
sexual harassment, and conspiracy.6
2. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND ITS A GOOD
THING, Too 102 (1994) (attributing the quote to "S. Johnson & S. Fish").
3. Justice Hugo Black was an absolutist and felt that the First Amendment
should be interpreted literally to prevent any government infringement on a citizen's
freedom of speech. As Justice Black put the matter.
The First Amendment is truly the heart of the Bill of Rights. The Fram-
ers balanced its freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition
against the needs of a powerful central government, and decided that in
those freedoms lies this nation's only true security. They were not afraid
for men to be free. We should not be.
Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 881 (1960); see also Don-
ald L. Beschle, An Absolutism that Works: Reviving the Original 'Clear and Present
Danger" Test, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 127, 129-31 (explaining that Black was an abso-
lutist in pure speech cases and applied a "balancing approach" for cases involving
conduct); Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amend-
ment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428, 432 (1967) (summarizing Justice Blacles basic First
Amendment philosophy as "[fireedom of speech is indivisible; unless we protect it for
all, we will have it for none .... The choice for freedom of speech is a choice made
once and for all by the Founding Fathers and is not subject to reassessment in light
of current anxieties"); Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitu-
tion, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 695-98 (1963) (observing that the Court's decisions in
the early 1950s, and their balancing of social interests, pushed Black further and
further, until he finally took an "absolute" view of the First Amendment).
4. See Reich, supra note 3, at 695-98.
5. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
6. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 667-72 (1991) (holding
that the First Amendment does not bar the application of ordinary principles of
state contract and promissory estoppel law in a suit against newspaper for breaching
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Indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, the government
may virtually regulate out of existence certain kinds of expres-
sive materials, such as obscenity,7 and certain kinds of expres-
sive conduct, such as nude dancing8 or the burning of draft reg-
istration cards.9 If one begins to consider in a systematic fashion
the recognized exceptions, the free speech protection afforded by
the First Amendment might begin to seem rather meager. A
cynical person might submit that the First Amendment's
protections are limited largely to prohibiting government censor-
ship based on viewpoint and the creation of prior restraints. Of
course, one might decry this state of affairs and urge a more
expansive interpretation of the Free Speech and Assembly
Clauses.10 The fact would remain that the federal courts have
a promise of confidentiality and printing a source's name); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (upholding the plaintiffs claim of a hostile work
environment under Title VII); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (upholding a copyright infringement action against The Nation
magazine for printing excerpts from President Gerald Ford's memoirs, and holding
that the First Amendment did not shield the magazine from the normal principles of
copyright liability); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (per curiam)
(upholding a constructive trust on defendants' book royalties for book published in
violation of preclearance agreement with CIA); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
571 (1973) (upholding California's "record piracy" law, noting that "[n]o restraint has
been placed on the use of an idea or concept").
7. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (reaffirming the unpro-
tected status of obscenity). The word "obscene" is a term of art, denoting material
that the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
appeals, on the whole, to the prurient interest; that depicts, in a patently offensive
manner, sexual conduct; and that, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, and scientific merit. See id. at 23-24. All three elements of this obscenity
definition must be satisfied in order for a publication to lose First Amendment pro-
tection. See id. at 24.
8. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560-61 (1991) (holding that a
state may prohibit nude dancing in bars even though such dancing constitutes ex-
pressive conduct).
9. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372 (1968) (upholding the applica-
tion of a law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards to an individual who burned
his card as part of an antiwar protest).
10. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985)
("Totalitarian governments today rule much of the planet, practicing suppression of
billions and spreading dogma that may enslave others. One of the things that sepa-
rates our society from theirs is our absolute right to propagate opinions that the
government finds wrong or even hateful."), afftd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See generally
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissive Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417 (1996) [Volokh, Freedom of Speech]; Eugene
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sustained a panoply of speech restrictions when necessary to
protect important government interests.
Undoubtedly, free speech imposes social costs on the commu-
nity." At its most basic, the use of public property for speech
activity often precludes the property from being used for other,
perhaps more usual, purposes. If a group of protesters stages a
rally in the town square, those who wish to use the square for
quiet contemplation are simply out of luck. Relatedly, if a pam-
phleteer distributes tracts that the uncaring public cavalierly
tosses upon the sidewalk, the community is forced to absorb the
cost of visual blight or additional street sweepers. Generally, the
Supreme Court has prohibited government from redistributing
the cost of speech activities to those engaged in a particular
speech activity. 2 This is especially so when the costs are related
directly to the local community's antipathy toward the speaker's
message.
13
Volokh, What Speech Does 'Hostile Work Environment' Harassment Law Restrict?, 85
GEO. L.J. 627 (1997). But see Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846,
849 (Cal. 1999) (upholding court ruling that enjoined manager from using any derog-
atory racial or ethnic epithets directed at or descriptive of Latino employees).
11. See FISH, supra note 2, at 115 ("I am not making a recommendation but de-
claring what I take to be an unavoidable truth. That truth is not that freedom of
speech should be abridged but that freedom of speech is a conceptual impossibility
because the condition of speech's [sic] being free in the first place is unrealizable.").
For an excellent discussion of the need to rethink whether victims of speech-related
harms should be required to "pay the price" of free speech, see Frederick Schauer,
Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 CoLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1992) ("[E]xisting under-
standings of the First Amendment presuppose that legal toleration of speech-related
harm is the currency with which we as a society pay for First Amendment protec-
tion.").
12. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992)
(holding that a local government could not impose costs associated with public antip-
athy towards a speaker's message because doing so would effectively ratify a
"heckler's veto"). But cf Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768-76
(1994) (upholding substantial portions of an injunction enjoining the picketing of
abortion clinics and residences of clinic personnel because of the effects of such
speech activity on clinic patients and personnel); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085,
1089-90 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding a content-neutral ordinance as a "reasonable re-
striction" that prevented the use of loudspeakers because the time, place, and man-
ner restriction served an important governmental interest of protecting patients in
hospitals from unwarranted intrusions into privacy).
13. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 373 (1997) ("'As a general
matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate in-
sulting, and even outrageous speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to
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No reasonable person would quibble with these rules. The
federal courts should not countenance a "heckler's veto." That
said, it does not require great imagination to conjure up a host
of perfectly constitutional restrictions of free speech. Indeed, this
Article already has sketched a number of scenarios in which gov-
ernment is permitted to tax the costs of the speech activity
against the speaker.14 If a moviegoer falsely shouts "fire" in a
crowded theater, she is exposed to liability for the consequential
damages resulting from the stampede for the door, including the
injuries suffered by fellow patrons, lost revenue on the part of
the theater owner, and perhaps even the costs associated with
the dispatch of the local fire company."5 Unlike the itinerant
street minister,16 the tortfeasor shouting "fire" in a crowded
theater is liable for the full social costs of her speech activity.
Obviously then, the fact that someone engages in speech activity
or expressive conduct does not automatically insulate them from
liability for the social harms caused by their speech activity or
expressive conduct."7 The question is more subtle: Sometimes
the costs are imposed on the speaker, and other times they are
not.
This squarely presents the question of whether and when the
government may assign the social costs of speech activities
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 322 (1988))); Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 132; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414 (1989) ("[Ihe government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Cole v. Richardson,
405 U.S. 676, 688-89 (1972) (Ihe First Amendment... leaves the way wide open
for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnox-
ions and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us." (quoting Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (1957))); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("[A]
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dis-
satisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging.").
14. See supra notes 6, 11 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16. But see Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cleveland, 105
F.3d 1107, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding a license fee for street peddlers under
the First Amendment because it was limited to defray expenses incurred in further-
ance of a legitimate state interest).
17. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("[The character of ev-
ery act depends on the circumstances in which it is done.").
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against speakers. Someone falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded
theater can be made to pay, whereas the street minister cannot.
Where do other cases fall and why? Between these two points
lies a continuum. Can the state tax the costs of hate speech
against speakers? The answer appears to be "no," at least not
directly.18 Suppose that a "gangsta" rapper advocates the murder
of members of the local police force as a necessary incident of
producing a social revolution, the product of which would be a
more egalitarian society?19 From a rather traditional point of
18. See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 132; see also RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 391-93 (1992) (explaining that viewpoint-based speech restrictions are im-
permissible even when the underlying speech activity is itself outside the scope of
the First Amendment); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991) ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of
their speech."); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) ('[T]he ability of govern-
ment... to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it" is permitted
only "'upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.' (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971))).
19. See TUPAC AMARU SHAKUR, Soulja's Story, on 2PACALYPSE NOW ("Cops on my
tail . .. , They finally pull me over and I laugh, Remember Rodney King, And I
blast on his punk ass ... "). This album contained six songs discussing killing po-
lice officers. It resulted in at least one lawsuit after an individual killed an officer
while listening to the album. See Davidson v. Time Warner, 25 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1705, 1712-14 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (dismissing negligence claims against the rapper
Tupac Shakur and Time Warner that alleged his album 2pacalypse Now incited the
murder of a police officer). In addition, this album and other gansta rap albums
became major campaign issues for some politicians. See Chris Morris, Quayle's
2Pac/Intrscope Attacks Puts New Heat on Time Warner, BILLBOARD, Oct. 3, 1992, at
5, available in 1992 WL 11646482 (quoting then Vice President Quayle describing
the album as "an irresponsible corporate act" and stating that the record should
never have been published). For a discussion of the attempt to censor music, see
generally Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expres-
sion Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew,
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1992) (providing a detailed overview of censorship in
the United States); David R. Dow, The Moral Failure of the Clear and Present Dan-
ger Test, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 733 (1998) (describing and critiquing the ap-
plication of the clear and present danger test to the First Amendment); Leola John-
son, Silencing Gangsta Rap: Class and Race Agenda in the Campaign Against Hard
Core Rap Lyrics, 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 25 (1994) (identifying the racial
and political basis of the campaign against "gangsta rap" music). For examples of
civil suits arguing that other forms of music caused harm, see generally Waller v.
Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (involving a suit for wrongful death
filed by the parents of a boy who committed suicide after repeatedly listening to the
music of heavy metal singer Ozzy Osbourne), affd without opinion, 958 F.2d 1084
(11th Cir. 1992); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988) (involv-
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view, the answer to this question should also be "no." Perhaps
the answer should be somewhat less absolute.
If the hypothetical rapper merely advocates the killing of
police officers in the abstract, settled case law would suggest
that the speech is protected.2" Absent a "clear and present dan-
ger" of an "imminent" risk of assassination, the state could not
criminalize the speech. 1 Suppose, however, that the rapper is a
bit less abstract, that she advocates the killing of a specific po-
lice officer, for example, Officer Mark Furhman. Does the case
become more difficult? At least arguably, it should. As one
moves from the mere abstract advocacy of a particular kind of
legal wrong toward the advocacy of a specific crime, the risk of
social harm increases. As one moves farther away from impas-
sioned calls to proletarian revolution and closer to the direct
advocacy of particular social harms, against specific persons, .the
potential cost of the speech activity increases precipitously, al-
though the contribution of the speech to the project of democratic
deliberation remains, at best, constant.2
A further slight modification of the hypothetical makes the
point a bit more vividly. Suppose the rapper not only advocates
the assassination of Mark Furhman, but also reports his home
address, telephone number, car make and model, and license
ing a suit similar to Waller); Judas Priest v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 760 P.2d
137 (Nev. 1988) (involving a suit filed against members of Judas Priest claiming
that the album Stained Class had caused the suicidal actions of two young men).
20. See infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text. For an excellent and thorough
analysis of potential constitutional principles that may apply to speech that causes
criminal activity, see KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIMES, & THE USES OF LAN-
GUAGE (1989).
21. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (ruling that
the right to free speech does "not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion"); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam) (explaining
that mere exhortation to engage in lawless illegal activities are not proscribable in
the absence of a clear and present danger of imminent lawlessness); Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam) (explaining that although a law
prohibiting threats to take the life of the President is constitutional on its face, the
government must prove that the language used demonstrated that the individual
truly intended to act on his threat).
22. See ALEXANDER MEmIKJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 22-27 (1948).
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plate number. She even includes his favorite restaurants and
bars, and the times at which he usually can be found in a partic-
ular place. The hypothetical begins to look more and more like
the solicitation of a crime, rather than the expression of an ab-
stract political idea. One can frame the issue even more starkly:
suppose the rapper also provides detailed instructions on how to
obtain an unregistered pistol and ammunition. The rap song
now advocates the death of a particular police officer, provides
accurate details about his whereabouts and personal habits, in
addition to detailed advice on where to obtain an illegal weapon.
These facts arguably place the hypothetical case much closer to
shouting "fire" in a crowded theater than to peacefully distribut-
ing leaflets in the town square.
The hypothetical rapper is advocating the murder of a specific
individual and providing crucial information to facilitate the
assassination. If someone uses this information to kill Mark
Furhman, may the rapper disclaim any legal responsibility for
the crime based on a First Amendment defense? This problem
extends beyond the hypothetical rapper. Recently, many racist
and anti-Semitic hate groups and other fringe organizations
have provided information in books and over the internet on
dedicated web sites on how to build bombs, pollute water sup-
plies, and build weapons.2" The time has come to ask whether
the social costs of such "Harm Advocacy"' must be taxed against
23. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Hate Groups Seeking Broader Reach, N.Y. TIMEs, July
7, 1999, at A16 (discussing hate groups using the internet to attract new followers);
Michel Marriot, Rising Tide: Sites Born of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at G4
(stating that an increasing number of hate groups have turned to the internet in the
hope of attracting new recruits); Jared Sandberg, Spinning a Web of Hate, NEWS-
WEEK, July 19, 1999, at 28 (noting the easy accessibility and inexpense of the web to
various hate groups, and stating that more than 2000 hate group websites are now
under observation by various civil liberties organizations). See generally Joseph P.
Shapiro, Extremism in America: An Epidemic of Fear and Loathing, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 8, 1995, at 37, 39 (stating that many hate groups are reported to be
communicating information on the internet about conspiracies and formulas for build-
ing bombs); Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., Hate Groups Embrace Cyberspace as Weapon,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1995, available in 1995 WL 13110157 (stating that hate groups
are using the internet as an affordable and quick method for spreading information).
24. This Article suggests the creation of a new category of speech, dubbed Harm
Advocacy. This category would encompass the narrow spectrum of expression that
both advocates and facilitates illegal or tortious activities against others. To satisfy
the requirements of Harm Advocacy speech, the plaintiff would need to prove that
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individual victims and the community at large. At least in some
circumstances, the courts should be able to impose the cost of
this Harm Advocacy on the speaker, provided that the rules
used to assign such costs do not unduly chill otherwise protected
expression.
Of course, if the government were to attempt to impose liability
for this sort of speech activity, it would be essential to ensure
that the mens rea requirement, the causation requirement, and
the evidentiary burden of proof are sufficient to provide ade-
quate breathing room for routine works of art. Tom Clancy,
Stephen King, Agatha Christie, and Patricia Cornwell write
books featuring grossly antisocial behavior.25 Nevertheless, these
fictionalized works do not constitute Harm Advocacy and should
not be suppressed.26 It is, of course, possible that someone might
read a novel by Clancy, King, Christie, or Cornwell and decide to
enact the fictionalized behaviors.27 That said, this Article does
the author of the speech either knew or acted with reckless disregard of the possi-
bility that recipients of the speech might act on the author's detailed suggestions on
how to commit a particular unlawful act and that the speech at issue cause, or be a
substantial factor, in the commission of a criminal act. For a further discussion of
Harm Advocacy, see infra notes 239-60 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., RICHARD BACIAN, RAGE (1977) (writing under the pen name Rich-
ard Bachman, Stephen King tells the story of a student who goes to class and
shoots his teacher and fellow classmates); AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORI-
ENT ExPRESS (1933) (discussing an elaborate murder by a group of individuals on a
train); TOM CLANCY, DEBT OF HONOR (1994) (discussing a plot to blow up the United
States capitol building during the State of the Union address); PATRICIA CORNWELL,
BLACK NOTICE (1999) (describing in detail the commission of a brutal murder).
26. See infra notes 261-68 and accompanying text. The First Amendment guaran-
tee of free speech extends to all artistic and literary expression-including pictures,
movies, and books. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)
("Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pic-
tures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment... fall
within the First Amendment guarantee."); see also Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tihe central concern of the
First Amendment... is that there be a free flow from creator to audience of what-
ever message a film or book might convey."); Superior Films v. Department of Educ.,
346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[The First Amendment draws no
distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas.").
27. For example, Stephen King's Rage has been cited as a potential causal factor
in several incidents of school violence. Rage involves a disturbed student who brings
a gun to school and kills two of his teachers before taking a class hostage. After
taking the class hostage, the student convinces his classmates to beat the school
bully. In 1989, police discovered a copy of the book in a student's bedroom after he
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not advocate the imposition of unlimited liability for authors and
songwriters; such an approach would be antithetical to the core
functions of the First Amendment.28 Writers such as Clancy,
King, Christie, and Cornwell are not soliciting crimes; their goal
is to entertain.2 9 The hypothetical rapper, on the other hand,
seems to be standing much closer to the line.
This Article explores the possibility of shifting the cost of
antisocial acts to artists, writers, and musicians when individu-
als decide to act on a creative artist's suggestions or, in some
cases, detailed directions. The Article concludes that, at least in
some limited circumstances, the First Amendment should not
preclude the imposition of civil liability for those who write and
distribute speech that both advocates and facilitates harm to
others and proposes the creation of a new category of unprotect-
ed speech activity called Harm Advocacy.
The contemporary First Amendment speech categories do not
address adequately the social costs associated with speech in-
tended to facilitate antisocial behavior. When addressing the
damage from speech that advocates harm, the federal courts
routinely have applied the Brandenburg v. Ohio test, a test de-
signed to protect political speech and the abstract advocacy of
violence or revolution."0 Brandenburg held that speech cannot be
had held a class of students hostage for nine hours at gunpoint. In 1996, officials
again found a copy of the book in a student's bedroom after he had killed four peo-
ple at his junior high school. See Alex Fryre, School Violence Pervades Films, Books
and Music, SEATILE TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 6268987
(discussing several violent school events that allegedly were copied from books and
music depicting teenage angst). As set forth in this Article, the Harm Advocacy
theory would not support the imposition of liability on Stephen King. See infra text
and accompanying notes 261-308.
28. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988) (dismissing, on
free speech grounds, a suit against Hustler magazine for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on a lewd caricature of Jerry Falwell).
29. Under current First Amendment analysis, however, these authors may some-
day find themselves in court. See Byers v. Edmonson, 712 So. 2d 681, 686-87, 690-
92 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (reinstating negligence and intentional tort claims based on
Oliver Stone's film Natural Born Killers and relying heavily on a recent interpreta-
tion of Brandenburg by the Fourth Circuit in Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998)). For a full discussion of Rice,
see infra notes 162-88 and accompanying text.
30. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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the basis for civil or criminal sanctions unless it both advocates
lawless conduct and poses a grave risk of actually inciting immi-
nent harm.31 Because instructional books, songs, and movies
generally require time for an individual to digest, such materials
generally will not meet Brandenburg's imminence require-
ment-a requirement that demands that the speech cause an
individual to act without rational thought.32 That is to say,
Brandenburg addresses speech activity designed to persuade
someone to commit an unlawful act, not speech designed to
facilitate the commission of an unlawful act by a person who has
already decided to act.3
Applying Brandenburg, courts generally have held Harm
Advocacy to be constitutionally protected expression, thereby
denying any effective remedy to injured plaintiffs.' To address
speech that does not produce imminent harm but nevertheless
advocates harm in a fashion that directly facilitates the realiza-
tion of the harm, perhaps at some later time, courts should de-
velop a new category of speech that more appropriately weighs
society's interest in protecting its citizens from socially harmful
31. See id. at 447. In Brandenburg, the Court conferred extremely broad protection
on political dissent and required that the government meet three different criteria to
regulate such speech. First, the speaker must promote not just any lawless action,
but "imminent" lawless action. See id. Second, the imminent lawless action must be
highly "likely" to occur. See id. Third, the speaker must intend to produce imminent
lawless action. See id. (stating that the speech must be "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action . . . ").
32. See id. ("[Clonstitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not per-
mit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and is likely to incite or produce such action."); see also Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) ("[Tihe mere abstract teaching. . t of the moral propri-
ety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.").
33. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (finding mere advocacy and teaching of
political violence to be constitutionally protected).
34. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 448 (1974) (citing
Brandenburg as standing for the proposition that the First Amendment generally
protects the mere advocacy of violence or lawless action at some indefinite time in
the future); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (upholding a protestor's
First Amendment right to use language directed against police officers that the po-
lice characterized as either "fighting words" or an incitement to lawlessness as pro-
tected speech at an antiwar demonstration).
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activities against the First Amendment's protection of free ex-
pression.
Part I of this Article reviews the First Amendment and the
relatively limited scope of its protections, refuting the argument
that any limitation on free speech ipso facto constitutes an in-
fringement of the First Amendment. Part II discusses the
Brandenburg test and its potential application to situations
involving speech that advocates socially harmful activity. Part
III argues that this approach is poorly suited to deal with the
problems inherent in such harm-promoting speech. By accommo-
dating only considerations that arise from the imminence of the
harm, and not the nature of the speech itself, the courts have
not permitted individuals to recover in tort for harm proximately
caused by such speech and intended by the speaker to cause
such harm. Part IV suggests the creation of a new category of
speech: Harm Advocacy speech. This category would include
speech that advocates, in detailed terms, the commission of a
criminal or grossly antisocial act (i.e., speech that closely ap-
proximates, but might not quite constitute, the crime of solicita-
tion). Recognition of this new category of speech would permit
courts to better analyze the conflict between society's need to
protect its citizens from violence and the First Amendment value
of free expression and democratic deliberation. In addition, Part
IV presents potential objections to the recognition of Harm Ad-
vocacy as a category of unprotected speech activity, and con-
cludes that although recognition of the new Harm Advocacy
speech category would permit government to regulate slightly
more speech than before, doing so would actually protect a
greater amount of speech than the courts' current ad hoc use of
the Brandenburg test. 5
35. In addition, because of the increasing violence allegedly related to popular
culture, including movies such as Natural Born Killers, Pulp Fiction, and songs such
as those by Marilyn Manson, Congress has determined that some censorship of these
items would be wise. Our proposal would limit the need for any congressional activity,
which we believe would allow for greater freedom of expression in the arts community
while still protecting individuals from Harm Advocacy speech.
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I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS NOT ABSOLUTE
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."36 In
turn, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorpo-
rates a free speech guarantee identical to the First Amendment's
guarantee.3 ' The text, although important, does not on its face
resolve specific free speech questions; the precise scope of "the
freedom of speech" is something that reviewing courts must
resolve on a case-by-case basis. 8
A. Federal Courts Do Not Treat Speech as Absolutely Protected
Reviewing courts charged with deciding free speech claims
have made clear that although the Free Speech Clause protects
certain forms of expression in order to advance particular social
goals, such as facilitating democratic self-governance, it does not
protect all speech as a matter of course.3 9 As noted previously,
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 215 (1995); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
37. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The
Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1086,
1115-19 (1998) (describing the incorporation process and Justice Hugo Black's jot for
jot" approach to the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, and noting
strands of Justice Black's reasoning in recent Supreme Court decisions severely lim-
iting the availability of substantive due process claims for unenumerated rights).
38. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNB, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21
(1984).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining that the Brandenburg test does not protect speech that directly threatens
another person); Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1121 (5th Cir. 1986) (ex-
plaining that the First Amendment does not protect criminal conduct "not aimed at
communicating ideas or information," even if it takes a verbal form).
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no one, not even Justice Black, has seriously advocated a truly
absolutist theory of the Free Speech Clause.4 ° "Free speech" is
free precisely because a court will classify it as such; whereas
proscribable speech enjoys that status precisely because a re-
viewing court would so classify the material at issue.41 In this
sense, it is simply not possible to maintain a viable theory of the
First Amendment that is content-neutral: the content of speech
prefigures its status as protected or proscribable.
This does not mean that free speech is an empty concept or
that judges simply make up free speech law as they go along.
Rather, it means that decisions about how to classify speech are
contestable, and that disagreement about the scope of the free
speech guarantee does not imply a failure to respect the First
Amendment. Thus, existing Supreme Court case law permits a
great deal of speech regulation when the speech causes cogniza-
40. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to an injunction forbidding unionized distributors from picketing to force
an illegal business arrangement, Justice Black wrote for the Supreme Court in
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.:
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech
and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject the con-
tention now . . . . It is true that the agreements and course of conduct
here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writ-
ing. But it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of
the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practical-
ly impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of
trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed inju-
rious to society.
336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949) (citations omitted).
41.
[W]hen a court invalidates legislation because it infringes on protected
speech, it is not because the speech in question is without consequences
but because the consequences have been discounted in relation to a good
that is judged to outweigh them. Despite what they say, courts are never
in the business of protecting speech per se, "mere" speech (a nonexistent
animal); rather . .. in relation to a value-the health of the republic,
the vigor of the economy, the maintenance of the status quo, the.undoing
of the status quo-that is the true, if unacknowledged, object of their
protection.
FISH, supra note 2, at 106.
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ble and well-recognized social harms,42 and this state of affairs
should not be particularly surprising.
B. Most Theories of Free Speech Do Not Protect Speech
Absolutely
In deciding particular cases, the federal courts rely on a vari-
ety of theories that help to explain or justify the protection of
speech activity.4" In other words, the federal courts bring to bear
some overarching theory of free speech before deciding to grant
or deny relief on First Amendment grounds.
The Supreme Court and numerous constitutional scholars
have relied on several different theories to identify the impor-
tant interests that the First Amendment protects. These theories
include the idea that free speech merits protection because it
helps to facilitate democratic deliberation," a marketplace of
ideas paradigm positing that free speech is necessary in order to
permit the pursuit of truth,45 libertarian theories tying free
42. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (upholding an FCC
decision prohibiting radio station from broadcasting comedian George Carlin's "Seven
Dirty Words" monologue because the agency deemed the routine "indecent" as to a
potential audience of minors).
43. See infra notes 67-105 and accompanying text; see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 18-65 (1992) (describing and critiquing the Su-
preme Court's various approaches to evaluating free speech claims).
44. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 26 ("Just so far as, at any point, the citi-
zeus who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion
or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the re-
sult must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good."); VAN
ALSTYNE, supra note 38, at 41-42 (describing the First Amendment's protection of
speech activities as a series of concentric circles, each further away from a "core" of
political speech); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987)
(arguing that the market "might be an effective institution for producing cheap and
varied consumer goods and for providing essential services ... but not for producing
the kind of debate that constantly renews the capacity of a people for self-determi-
nation"); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the First Amendment has a "structural role to
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government"); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("e protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (explaining that the First Amendment's pur-
pose is facilitating the project of democratic self-government).
45. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
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speech to self-realization or personal autonomy,46 and more prac-
tically oriented theories that justify free speech as a kind of
social safety valve that permits disgruntled political minorities
to vent without resorting to acts of violence. The degree to
which a particular instance of speech advances these or other
which truth will ultimately prevail . . . ."); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . ."); see also MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 1.02, at 1-20, 1-48 (1984) (stating that the checking value
in self-government and the marketplace of ideas concept sometimes are grouped to-
gether in the more general principle of enlightenment); 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET
AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.6, at 15-16
& n.12 (1986). But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIScOURS-
ES ON LIFE AND LAw 129 (1987) (arguing that women are silenced and denied equal
access to modes of expression); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legiti-
mizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 36-37 (concluding that the market place theory's as-
sumption of equal access is no longer defensible).
46. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11-14
(1984) (making a strong argument that the ultimate purpose of the First Amend-
ment is to enhance "individual self-realization," including individual self-fulfillment as
well as autonomy in making decisions about one's own destiny); see also Consolidat-
ed Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980) (explaining that
the First Amendment "protects the individual's interests in self-expression"); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) ("The individual's interest in
self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for
open and informed discussion . . . ."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)
(declaring the First Amendment's protections important to individual dignity and
choice); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties . .. ."); Robert Post, Equality and Autono-
my in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1525 (1997) (arguing
that the First Amendment allows for the "reconciliation of individual and collective
autonomy"); Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Ex-
pression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 521 (1979) (discussing "participant interests" in
freedom of expression).
47. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[Tjhe path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances .... Fear of
serious injury [to the social order] cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech .... Men feared witches and burnt women."); see also Milk Wagon Drivers
Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941) (stating
that free speech averts "force and explosions"); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (stating that freedom of expression allows conflict
to take place without destroying society); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media
Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 949 (1978) ("There
is cathartic value in having speakers who might otherwise become dangerous release
their tensions through verbal violence rather than physical violence.").
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court-identified interests should and usually does determine the
amount of protection the speech receives.48
All of these free speech theories share the common character-
istic that speech activity enjoys constitutional protection only
insofar as it advances the underlying objectives of the First
Amendment. Moreover, all of these theories are "designed to
guard against the danger that the government is only pretend-
ing to be concerned about noise, litter, offensiveness, or a hostile
audience reaction but in fact is reacting to the feared persua-
siveness of the speech that it seeks to suppress."49
Notwithstanding the prevalence of free speech theories relying
on the content of the speech to determine the appropriate scope
of First Amendment protection, some scholars and jurists have
interpreted the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause as repre-
senting a kind of absolute value that cannot be compromised.5"
48. See 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 45, § 20.6, at 13-17 (arguing that inherent
in the First Amendment protections is also the freedom to hear, because the First
Amendment prevents government suppression of certain speech, thus allowing citi-
zens to hear criticism and unpopular ideas); see also Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tihe central First
Amendment concern remains the need to maintain free access of the public to the
expression."); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (stating
that viewers have the right of access to social, aesthetic, and moral ideas and ex-
pression) (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390). The Supreme Court's deference to legis-
lative enactments designed to protect children from sexually explicit speech provide
an interesting counterexample. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 728 (1978);
see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755-
56 (1996) (explaining that the methods used to restrict access of children to offensive
speech in the broadcast industry are constitutional, if narrowly tailored to meet that
goal). The Supreme Court has not imposed consistently a least restrictive means
requirement when the government seeks to suppress the dissemination of sexually
explicit, but nonobscene, programming. One cannot help but wonder if this reflects
the Supreme Court's tacit agreement with Congress that such speech is distasteful
and objectionable, rather than a principled response to a pressing social problem.
49. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 338 (1991); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 134 (1993) ("Government is rightly distrusted when it is
regulating speech that might harm its own interests; and when the speech at issue
is political, its own interests are almost always at stake."). See generally Charles
Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CM. L.
REV. 225 (1992) (arguing that the government has no business seeking to control the
minds of its citizens).
50. As noted above, Justice Black professed to hold this view, stating that the
First Amendment means literally what it says 'without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or
'whereases.'" Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
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These scholars take the position that free speech and the values
it represents are a preferred freedom, a constitutional value that
is a kind of first among equals.5' From this perspective, free
speech values cannot be compromised in order to serve other
important values, even constitutional values, no matter how
socially or politically desirable.52
Nevertheless, Justice Black both authored and joined majority opinions that would
allow some restrictions. For example, Justice Black joined Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), a case in which the Court refused to
allow a criminal conviction to stand for wearing a jacket bearing an offensive exple-
tive in a public courthouse. See id. at 26. The dissenting Justices argued that wear-
ing the jacket with the expletive constituted conduct, not speech. See id. at 27-28
(Blackmun, Burger, Black, JJ., dissenting). Professor Melville Nimmer claims that
those holding the absolutist position use conduct as a code word for speech that
they find to be undeserving of First Amendment protections. See NIMIER, supra note
45, § 2.01, at 2-7; see also Kinsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Envi-
ronment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 550 (1991)
(noting that because Title VII permits some statements about race or sex and disap-
proves of others, it violates the principle that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea because it finds it offensive); Robert W. Gall, The University as
an Industrial Plant: How a Workplace Theory of Discriminatory Harassment Creates
a "Hostile Environment" for Free Speech in America's Universities, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 203, 210-11 (arguing that colleges and universities should
not import the hostile environment theory into their speech codes because of the
threat it poses to the free speech rights of faculty and students); Steven G. Gey, The
Case Against Post-Modern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 194 (1996)
(arguing that efforts to balance speech rights against other values nevertheless con-
stitutes censorship); William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical
Review, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 87 (arguing that the job of
the university faculty is to "test and propose revisions in the prevailing wisdom,"
which can be achieved only through academic freedom based on the First Amend-
ment); Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 10, at 2417-18 (arguing that content-
based restrictions on fully protected speech should be invalidated); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1793 (1992)
[hereinafter Volokh, Workplace Harassment] (arguing that the hostile work environ-
ment theory imposes impermissible content and viewpoint-based restrictions on
workplace speech).
51. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 45, § 2.02, at 2-9, -10 (arguing against ad hoc
balancing of constitutional interests because of the danger that free speech may be
restricted); Gey, supra note 50, at 193-94 (criticizing "progressive constitutional schol-
ars" who would attack the absolute protection of free speech and the First Amend-
ment in the interests of promoting racial and gender equality); Volokh, Workplace
Harassment, supra note 50, at 1793 (arguing that certain sexual harassment causes
of action intended to promote gender equality under Title VII impermissibly violate
the First Amendment freedom of speech guarantee).
52. See Gey, supra note 50, at 195-96.
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Most recently, these scholars have questioned campus speech
codes and the recognition of hostile work environment claims
under Title VII, arguing that these regulations act to censor and
prohibit free speech in the workplace and on college campuses,
and therefore should be deemed unconstitutional. 53 Based on the
First Amendment values mentioned above, their basic argument
is that the value of free speech trumps society's efforts to
achieve racial and sexual equality. They assert that the constitu-
tional protection accorded to the freedom of speech logically fol-
lows from the fact that the benefits society reaps from the free
flow and exchange of ideas outweigh any costs society incurs by
receiving hurtful or even affirmatively dangerous ideas.54
It is difficult to understand why free speech concerns should
always and routinely take precedence over society's efforts to
eliminate various forms of discrimination. When weighing the
social values implicated by permitting greater access to jobs on
53. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 50, at 481 (arguing that certain applications of
Title VII violate the First Amendment in the workplace); Nadine Strossen, Regulat-
ing Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484, 493-94
(maintaining "that equality will be served most effectively by continuing to apply
traditional, speech-protective precepts to racist speech, because a robust freedom of
speech ultimately is necessary to combat racial discrimination"); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1009, 1011-12 (1996) (arguing that trying to achieve Title VII's broad rule of
workplace equality by applying the hostile environment theory of discrimination in
the workplace threatens the First Amendment freedoms of workers and employers);
Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV.
563, 574-79 (1995) (arguing that some balancing of interests may be necessary in
First Amendment cases, and further arguing that any balancing should be closely
cabined by adherence to formal rules); Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and
Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 7 (1991) (advocating a strong First Amendment
position regarding hate speech regulation to limit power of censorship). But see
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 45-48 (1993); Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343
(1991); Jessica M. Karner, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive
Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REV. 637 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320 (1989); Suzanne Sangree, Title WI Prohibitions Against Hostile Envi-
ronment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995).
54. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (allowing a restriction on
political speech in order to serve the "compelling interest" of allowing voters to be
free from polling place intimidation); infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
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an equal basis to all members of society and the right to display
vile pornography in the workplace, it hardly seems unreasonable
to conclude that an individual's right to work should displace
another individual's right to expression.55 Similarly, informing a
young college student that he cannot wear a T-shirt bearing a
sexist message in the library does not seem to seriously threaten
core speech values. Such a conclusion seems eminently reason-
able if, as a society, we value the ability of all students, male
and female, to have an equal opportunity to receive an education
and to use the university's library. After all, as legal scholars
like Professors Richard Delgado and Mari Matsuda have noted,
equality is a constitutional value too, reflected in the text of both
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.56 As a matter of
logic and text, equality of gender and race stems from the Four-
teenth Amendment, a later-in-time provision that modifies earlier
constitutional provisions, presumably including the First
Amendment.
57
Despite the existence of a dedicated corps of free speech abso-
lutists, most constitutional theorists agree that the government
must be permitted to limit some forms of speech.5" "[T]he First
55. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
208-13 (1979); see also Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal.
1999) (holding an injunction that enjoined a manager from making racist remarks
constitutional). See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S 57, 73 (1986)
(holding that Title VII creates a cause of action based on the maintenance of a
hostile work environment).
56. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 53; Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
133 (1982); Matsuda, supra note 53; see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282
(1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Free speech is not so absolute or irrational a
conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective protection of all the free-
doms secured by the Bill of Rights.").
57. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124, 151-55 (1992). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 176-248 (1960) (discussing the framing of the First Amend-
ment and its original intentions-the creation of a free press).
Other examples also exist. For example, we value the right of all individuals to
vote. If an individual set up a display offensive to women in front of a voting booth,
clearly his right to expression would not trump the right of the women who use
that voting booth to vote.
58. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 20-21 (1975); Scanlon, supra note 46, at 520-21; Frederick
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 265 (1981) (attempting to define the limits of the free speech guarantee); Paul
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Amendment does not guarantee an absolute right to anyone to
express their views any place, at any time, and in any way they
want."59 Indeed, even the Framers of the Bill of Rights probably
envisioned some limits to the right of free expression." This is
not to say that not all statements are speech,61 but rather that
not all statements are protected speech.62
B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV.
203, 203-07 (1982) (noting that the approach reflected in the Courfs free speech
opinions posits some hierarchy of values entitled to constitutional protection); see
also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U.
L. REV. 281, 283 (1995) (stating that the freedom of speech never has received abso-
lute protection from the Court); Posner, supra note 1, at 7 (arguing that the Fram-
ers of the First Amendment would not have wanted to "tie the hands of govern-
ment" from stopping the spread of "worthless and vicious ideas").
59. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Heifron v. Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981)); see Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) ("Where First Amendment rights are asserted
... resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the com-
peting private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.");
see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (holding that con-
tent-neutral regulation of noise level at a concert is a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction on speech).
60. Certainly the contemporaneous actions of Congress support such an inference.
In 1798, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Act, a law establishing content-
based restrictions on core political speech. See Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596
(1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C. §
21-23 (1999)); Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1
Stat. 566 (1798). The Act was a wartime measure to deport threatening aliens and
silence attacks on the government. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 273-75 (1964); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1, 29 (1920); LEVY,
supra note 57, at 197-200; see also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206
(1919) ("We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other
competent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling
of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional inter-
ference with free speech."); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the
First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159,
1165 n.25 (1982) ("There can be little doubt that whatever the framers intended, it
was not absolute protection.").
61.
It is not true that "fighting words" have at most a "de minimis" expres-
sive content or that their content is in all respects "worthless and unde-
serving of constitutional protection" ... . We have not said that they
constitute "no part of the expression of ideas," but only that they consti-
tute "no essential part of any exposition of ideas."
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384-85 (1992) (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
62. See id.
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Even the relative absolutists would permit the criminalization
of fraud, although such fraud involves speech activity.63 Like-
wise, few would suggest that laws criminalizing threats against
the life of the President violate the Free Speech Clause, or that
the First Amendment protects your right to "joke" with airport
security about explosive materials in your luggage." As Profes-
sor Stanley Fish has explained, any plausible theory of free
speech requires significant line drawing.65 Whether the line
drawing constitutes a principled or political exercise is largely in
the eyes of the beholder.66
C. The First Amendment Is Not Absolute
Although the First Amendment's protection of pure advocacy
is quite robust, it permits viewpoint-neutral speech regulations67
63. See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations
and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1344 (1998).
64. See id. at 1380. See generally United States v. Hicks, 980 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.
1992) (upholding a statute regulating airline passenger speech); People v. Rubin, 96
Cal. App. 3d 968 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that an offer of $500 to anyone "who kills,
maims or seriously injures a member of the American Nazi Party" made at a press
conference in connection with a protest of a Nazi march was not protected by the
First Amendment).
65. See FISH, supra note 2, at 102-19.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984) (distinguishing viewpoint versus content-neutral regulation); cf. United
States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605 (1995) (rejecting the defendant's interpretation
of the First Amendment in part because "the statute here in question does not im-
pose such a restriction [on the disclosure of wiretap authorizations]- generally, but
only upon those who disclose wiretap information 'in order to obstruct, impede, or
prevent' the [wiretap] interception"); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1981) (up-
holding the Secretary of State's revocation of the defendant's passport based on a
federal statute because "[the defendant's] disclosures, among other things, have the
declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelli-
gence personnel"); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a federal statute criminalizing the teach-
ing or demonstration of the making of any explosive device after construing the
statute to require "intent or knowledge that the information disseminated would be
used in the furtherance of a civil disorder"); National Mobilization Comm. to End
the War in Vietnam v. Foran, 411 F.2d 934, 937-38 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that the
plaintiffs attacks on the 1968 Civil Disorders and Riot Provisions of the Criminal
Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 231, 232, 2101, and 2102, did not present a substantial First
Amendment question because the "statute expressly excludes oral or written advocacy
of ideas or expressions of belief not involving violence").
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and prohibitions to achieve important social goals when the
social risks posed by the speech clearly exceed the benefits po-
tentially associated with it.68 As the Supreme Court explained in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:69
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in-
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very ut-
terance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.70
Rather than adopting an absolute approach to defining the
limits of constitutionally protected speech, courts instead have
adopted a series of category-based balancing tests.71 Determining
whether speech receives First Amendment protection involves a
68. For example, the First Amendment even permits limitations on the freedom of
the press. See Howard Kurtz, Cincinnati Ex-Reporter Pleads Guilty, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 25, 1998, at A3 (discussing plea taken by Cincinnati Enquirer reporter after
admitting that he stole voice-mail messages from Chiquita when writing an article
that asserted that "Chiquita secretly controls banana companies in Latin America
... that employees were involved in a bribery scheme, and that Chiquita ships
have been used to smuggle cocaine") [hereinafter Kurtz, Guilty]; see also John Nolan,
Newspaper Apologizes to Chiquita; to Pay $10M, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 1998, at
A10 (discussing the Cincinnati Enquirer Chiquita story and discussing ethics in jour-
nalism). Although some press people were upset that the Enquirer paid the settle-
ment so quickly, no one argued that the reporter's behavior was proper or could not
be sanctioned due to the First Amendments protection of the freedom of the press.
See Howard Kurtz, Outbreak of Fiction is Alarming News, WASH. POST, June 29,
1998, at BI (decrying the Chiquita story and settlement and urging greater accuracy
in media reporting).
69. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
70. Id. at 571-72. For an excellent review of the First Amendment protections
afforded various types of speech, see William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the
Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982).
71. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV.
297, 342 (1995) (positing that categorization is inherent in how humans think and
communicate); Van Alstyne, supra note 70, at 139-42; Amar, supra note 57, at 127-
28. But see Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of
Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 731-39 (1983).
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risk-benefit analysis in which federal courts determine what
risks the community must shoulder to secure the considerable
benefits of free speech in a democratic society 2 and, conversely,
what risks are not worth taking." In a variety of criminal cases,
the courts have not hesitated to reject a First Amendment de-
fense even when oral or written communications are the princi-
pal aspect of the crime.74 In the civil context, implicit balances
72. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 338-40 (1974) (discussing the
importance of protecting political advocacy even at the risk of protecting some erro-
neous statements which are inevitable to free debate); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) ("In order for the State in the per-
son of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it
must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpop-
ular viewpoint."); see also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1019
(5th Cir. 1987) ("The constitutional protection accorded to the freedom of speech and
of the press is not based on the naive belief that speech can do no harm but on the
confidence that the benefits society reaps from the free flow and exchange of ideas
outweigh the costs society endures by receiving reprehensible or dangerous ideas.").
73. Although the First Amendment protects most messages, some messages are
considered to be more valuable and more worthy of protection. See R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384-85 (1992). But see Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1019 (holding
that a magazine was not liable for the death of a boy who tried to practice auto-
erotic asphyxia after reading an article in the magazine); Berger v. Battaglia, 779
F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that entertainment is less worthy of protection
than political speech).
74. The Court recently reaffirmed:
Although agreements to engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess
some element of association, the State may ban such illegal agreements
without trenching on any right of association protected by the First
Amendment. The fact that such an agreement necessarily takes the form
of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, the
constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to
speech.... [W]hile a solicitation to enter into an agreement arguably
crosses the sometimes hazy line distinguishing conduct from pure speech,
such a solicitation, even though it may have an impact in the political
arena, remains in essence an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange
for private profit, and may properly be prohibited.
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982); see also NOW v. Operation Rescue, 37
F.3d 646, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("That 'aiding and abetting' of an illegal act may be
carried out through speech is no bar to its illegality."); United States v. Freeman,
761 F.2d 549, 551-52 (9th Cir. 1985) (sustaining convictions for the aiding and abet-
ting of tax fraud and noting that "the First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the
intent of the actor and the objective meaning of the words used are so close in time
and purpose to a substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself. In
those instances, where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amend-
ment defense is foreclosed even if the prosecution rests on words alone" (citations
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are constantly being struck concerning the importance of pro-
tecting an individual's reputation, the benefits of consumer pro-
tection laws, and truthful advertising.7 5
For example, statutes exist that prohibit telemarketing
fraud, 6 making jokes about bombs at airports, and threatening
the President's life.78 These statutes do not violate the First
Amendment, because our society has balanced the social harm of
such speech against its potential social value and determined
that such speech does not contribute sufficient information or
ideas to outweigh its potential for causing harm. In the case of
threats against the President, the Executive Branch could not
function effectively if the President worried constantly about his
safety."0 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, this sort of
speech activity does not promote any of the First Amendment's
omitted)); People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968 (Ct. App. 1979) (noting that the con-
trolling factors for determining whether speech arguably constituting solicitation of a
crime is protected by the First Amendment are words themselves and the attendant
circumstances of the use of those words); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 837 (2d ed. 1988) ("[Ihe law need not treat differently the
crime of one man who sells a bomb to terrorists and that of another who publishes
an instructional manual for terrorists on how to build their own bombs out of old
Volkswagen parts.").
75. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
763 (1985) (concluding that the victim of a negligently erroneous credit report might
recover presumed and punitive damages from the publisher absent a showing of
"actual malice" without violating the First Amendment because the defamatory state-
ments did not deal with matters of public concern); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (stating that although libelous speech may be protected by
the First Amendment, the state may regulate such speech within certain constitu-
tionally established boundaries).
76. See Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-84, 112
Stat. 520 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2326 (Supp. 1999)).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. 1999).
78. See id. § 871 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
79. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ("[A] State in the exercise
of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utter-
ances inimical to the public welfare .. ").
80. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) ("The Na-
tion undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety
of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without interference
from threats of physical violence."); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We should say here that the Presidents constitution-
ally assigned duties include complete control over investigation and prosecution of
violations of the law, and that the inexorable command of Article H is clear and
definite: the executive power must be vested in the President of the United States.").
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underlying values. Threats against the life of the President do
not add anything meaningful to the marketplace of ideas, nor do
they promote democratic self-governance or self-expression.8' In
the United States, political disagreements are settled at the
ballot box, not with bullets. To the extent such speech activity
advances autonomy values, the cost it imposes on the psychologi-
cal and physical well-being of the President far outweigh the
value inherent in a would-be prankster's sophomoric antics.
Even in the area of political speech, the government may
impose viewpoint-neutral restrictions if the speech activity in-
cites violence or contains a falsehood.82 If a small group of Serbi-
an radicals wished to show their displeasure over NATO's and
the United States's recent bombing of their country, they could
shower New York with leaflets discussing the bombing. If, how-
ever, they deliberately inserted lies about President Clinton into
the pamphlet, the courts would permit the President to sue for
and, if he satisfied his burden of proof, win bankrupting dama-
ges. 3 Thus, our society does not always force the victim of
speech activity to bear its costs, even if this means putting a
publisher out of business." The face of the laws seldom reflects
this balancing exercise; nevertheless, the balance is implicit and
incorporates an assumption that such restrictions on speech
activity are both constitutional and desirable.85 Accordingly, to
81. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
82. See Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12-23 (1990); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
83. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 347-48, 352 (1974) (holding
that the state's interest in preventing reputational harm was sufficient to permit
tort recovery under some circumstances); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 283 (1964) (same); see also Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Reju-
venation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983) (discussing the
availability of unlimited damages in defamation actions).
84. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-79 (1977) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment did not protect the defendants from liability under
the common law tort of "appropriation" or "right of publicity" when the news media
filmed the plaintiff's "human cannonball" act at a county fair and broadcast the act
without the plaintiffs permission); see also Kurtz, Guilty, supra note 68, at A3 (dis-
cussing a reporter's prosecution and guilty plea for stealing voice-mail messages from
the target of a newspaper investigation).
85. Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, the government may even shut
down the market for services that society finds to be completely undesirable and
harmful. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1990) (finding that Stanley
1184
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speak of an "absolute" First Amendment is not only nonsensi-
cal, 6 but also meaningless. 7 The values are contestable and
need to be debated.
D. Balancing Free Speech Against Competing Social Values
In order to balance properly the conflicting community inter-
ests and maintain the protection of free speech, contemporary
v. Georgia, which permits pornography in the home, did not apply to child pornogra-
phy); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753, 774 (1982) (upholding state regulations
that prohibited the distribution of films depicting minors performing sexual acts
because safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor was a
compelling state interest). In these cases, the Supreme Court took child pornography
outside the First Amendment, determining that its social costs would not be taxed
against those who cannot protect themselves. This philosophy extends to additional
aspects of the media. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1978) (up-
holding an FCC order banning "indecent" speech from the air waves during the time
when children would be in the audience).
86. See Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087,
2087 (1991) ("There was a sense in the body politic that the First Amendment is
not simply a technical legal rule, . . . but rather an organizing principle of society,
central to our self-understanding as a nation and foundational to a vast network of
highly cherished social practices and institutions.").
87. In an attempt to explain why many people cling to the absolutist notion of
the First Amendment, Stanley Fish bluntly states:
The answer, I think is that people cling to First Amendment pieties
because they do not wish to [face] what they correctly take to be the
alternative. That alternative is politics, the realization (at which I have
already hinted) that decisions about what is and is not protected in the
realm of expression will rest not on principle or firm doctrine but on the
ability of some persons to interpret-recharacterize or rewrite-principle
and doctrine in ways that lead to the protection of speech they want
heard and the regulation of speech that they want silenced. (That is how
George Bush can argue for flag-burning statutes and against campus
hate-speech codes.). When the First Amendment is successfully invoked,
the result is not a victory for free speech in the face of a challenge from
politics but a political victory won by the party that has managed to
wrap its agenda in the mantel of free speech.
FISH, supra note 2, at 110; see Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech,
and the Idea of a University, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 195, 223-
24 (arguing that one's view of the mission of a college or university has an impact
on the validity of speech restrictions in asking: "Might not the university say that
part of its legitimate mission is to teach students how to contend vigorously within
the marketplace of ideas while nevertheless observing certain norms of civility?
Might not the university claim that part of its mission is to encourage the triumph
of the rational and contemplative sides of the intellect over passion and prejudice?"
(footnote omitted)).
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federal courts have adopted a categorical approach in defining
the limits of First Amendment protection.88 A court employing
the categorical approach classifies speech incident to an analysis
of any First Amendment claim.89 The reviewing court's classifica-
tion then prefigures the burden on the government to sustain
the restriction. Certain forms of speech activity enjoy particularly
strong constitutional protection (e.g., core political speech),
whereas other categories of speech (e.g., obscenity, child pornog-
raphy) do not enjoy any First Amendment protection per se,
although the government may not engage in viewpoint discrimi-
nation when suppressing otherwise impermissible forms of ex-
pression.90
The unprotected categories of speech are unprotected precisely
because the threatened social harms associated with the speech
outweigh any potentially offsetting social value associated with
the particular type of speech.9 In other words, the content of
88. See RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). Another approach
involves a case-by-case, ad hoc balancing of the competing interests. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950) (stating that a court's duty is
to determine which of two conflicting interests demands greater protection). Ad hoc
balancing requires consideration of the total circumstances of each case, weighing the
plaintiff's interests against those of the defendant. The Supreme Court has discour-
aged ad hoc balancing. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974)
(declaring that ad hoc balancing in First Amendment litigation is not feasible and
that it would be unwise to commit the task to judges).
89. Cf Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 780-
81 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the exist-
ing First Amendment doctrine supports placing the speech at issue into settled cate-
gories as part of the constitutional analysis).
90. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390-94 (invalidating St. Paul, Minnesota's hate crime
ordinance as unconstitutionally prohibiting otherwise impermissible speech activity
solely on the basis of the content and viewpoint of the speaker).
91. See id- at 383 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973) (elucidating the ele-
ments that the Court requires to find speech unprotected because it is "obscene").
Thus, obscene speech might possess some artistic, literary, social, or scientific value
and still be proscribed; a work is nonobscene only if, "taken as a whole" it provides
.serious" artistic, literary, or scientific value. See id. at 24. To allow speech possess-
ing any social value to enjoy an absolute legal privilege would lead to chaos. A
fraudulent offer featuring a sonnet by Shakespeare would escape the law's reach,
just as a threat to the President's life, accompanied by a bold, evocative graphic,
would enjoy protection. The fact that there is some potential hypothetical value in
speech activity does not prevent the speech activity from being placed in a proscrib-
able category. See id. Societal interests in maintaining peace and order, for example,
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some speech may be regulated because the potential benefit to
the community pales in comparison to the risks the community
faces if would-be speakers freely disseminate such speech. 2
Federal courts have established at least five identifiable cate-
gories of speech that pose a sufficient risk to society such that
regulation by the government of speech based on content, but
not viewpoint, may be constitutionally permissible. These excep-
tions are for fighting words, 3 obscenity,94 defamation, 5 commer-
cial speech,96 and speech likely to incite imminent lawless ac-
tion.97 Courts have settled upon the last of these exceptions
when deciding cases involving forms of Harm Advocacy.9"
outweigh the interest of protecting the freedom of speech when the speech incites
imminent lawlessness. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per
curiam).
92. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
93. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-74 (1942) (noting that
Chaplinsky had called a local policeman a "God damned racketeer" and a "damned
Fascist" after a traffic officer had stopped Chaplinsky from handing out leaflets to a
restless crowd). Fighting words are those words that by their very utterance will
provoke a reasonable person to immediate rage and violence. See id. at 572.
94. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-83
(1957). The obscenity exception is probably best known for the difficulties associated
with defining it. This difficulty was perhaps best illustrated by Justice Stewart's
blithe assurances that, "I know it when I see it ... " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
95. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). Causes of action for defamation include slander,
libel, and various invasion of privacy torts. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFA-
MATION passim (1996).
96. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454-56 (1978). Unlike the
speech prohibited by the other exceptions, speech made for commercial purposes is
not inherently bad. See id. at 455. Such speech, however, is not protected automati-
cally. See id. at 456; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (holding that truthful commercial speech may be
regulated only if the government interest is substantial, the regulation directly ad-
vances the governments interests, and the regulation is no more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest).
97. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
98. See infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text.
Were the First Amendment to offer protection even in these circum-
stances, one could publish, by traditional means or even on the internet,
the necessary plans and instructions for assassinating the President, for
poisoning a city's water supply, for blowing up a skyscraper or public
building, or for similar acts of terror and mass destruction, with the spe-
cific, indeed even the admitted, purpose of assisting such crimes-all with
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States may regulate unprotected speech through either crimi-
nal99 or civil penalties, 00 if the regulation precisely defines1' the
proscribed speech, the regulation is narrowly tailored to avoid
the substantial evil associated with the category of speech at
issue, and the regulations are viewpoint neutral. 0 2 Vague or
overbroad regulations violate the Constitution because they
punish protected speech0 3 or act effectively as prior restraints
0 4
through their chilling effect.0 5
impunity.
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 250-51 (1961) (commenting that if the defendant taught
how to kill a man with a pencil as advocacy, that speech could be constitutionally
proscribed).
99. States may impose criminal sanctions if the speech is incitement. See infra
notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
100. Cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668-72 (1991) (finding in a civil
promissory estoppel case that the First Amendment does not bar liability for a
newspaper's publication of a confidential source's name); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985) (rejecting a First Amendment de-
fense to copyright infringement action against a magazine for printing unauthorized
presidential memoir excerpts).
101. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) ("[Sltandards of permissible
statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.").
102. Courts will strike down regulations that are not narrowly drafted because an
overbroad regulation may reach speech that the state is not entitled to regulate. See
id. at 432-33; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
103. Even protected speech may be regulated in some ways. For example, states
may restrict the time, place, and manner of speech if the restrictions are not directed
at suppressing speech, they further an important or substantial governmental inter-
est, and any incidental regulation of speech is no greater than necessary to further
the governmental interest. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). If
the governmental regulation impinges upon basic First Amendment rights, the bur-
den is on the government to show the absence of less intrusive alternatives. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 658
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
104. The Supreme Court has characterized the avoidance of prior restraints on
speech as the First Amendment's most important safeguard. See Patterson v. Colora-
do, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (stating that the main purpose of the First Amendment
is to prevent "previous restraints"). More recently, the Court has expanded the scope
of the Amendments protection beyond prior restraints. See Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979). Nonetheless, the Court continues to emphasize
that avoiding prior restraints is the "chief purpose" of the First Amendment. See
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 n.25 (1979). For a more complete
discussion of these cases and the prior restraint doctrine, see NIMMER, supra note
45, § 4.02, at 4-17.
105. Regulations that are overbroad or vague carry the danger that they will act as
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E. The Rise of Harm Advocacy
The relatively new series of instructional books and manuals
available on the market, which contain explicit instructions to
would-be criminals, as well as noncriminal readers, on how to
commit a crime, provide a significant example of the danger
inherent in some kinds of speech."0 6 For instance, why do courts
permit books concerning how to commit a murder and how to
build a bomb to be published without their authors incurring
potential civil or criminal liability? The question is even more
difficult when those products are put to their intended uses,
causing serious social harm.
Consider, for example, a book providing detailed instructions
on how to construct, place, and detonate an explosive device in a
public place. When a publisher prints and distributes such a
book, it intends to cause harm or is at least grossly indifferent to
the prospect of harm. Under the common law of torts, the vic-
tims of a resulting harm could recover damages, either for an
intentional tort or negligence assuming that they could show
that the book caused their injuries.' 7 The First Amendment,
a prior restraint through self-censorship. Cf. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-500 (1982) (upholding an ordinance, though
arguably vague and overbroad, because "[t]his ordinance simply regulates business
behavior" and the commercial marketing of drug paraphernalia).
106. Many "how to" manuals are now easily available to the public. For a listing of
some of the many manuals that the public may purchase concerning how to commit
various crimes, see Amitai Etzioni, Is Information on How to Make a Bomb More
Harmful than Porn?, CaI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1995, at 31, available in 1995 WL
6239239 (listing numerous books available through mail order, including the follow-
ing: Ragnar's Guide to Home and Recreational Use of High Explosives, The Big Book
of Mischief, and The Terrorist Handbook).
107. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
30 (5th ed., 1984) (discussing the elements of negligence). For example, if a negli-
gent physical act causes injury, the tortfeasor, absent a defense, is usually liable. If,
however, that same injury is the result of some form of speech, the First Amend-
ment may insulate the tortfeasor from liability. See, e.g., Cardozo v. True, 342 So.
2d 1053, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the plaintiff, injured as a
result of a cookbook's inadequate warnings regarding poisonous ingredients used in
recipe, could not recover for breach of implied warranty because the protections of
the Uniform Commercial Code did not extend to "the thoughts and ideas conveyed"
by the cookbook). The First Amendment applies because common law tort liability is
a form of state action. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964) ("The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, what-
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however, has been deployed to block the imposition of tort liabil-
ity.'08 Because a victim's ability to recover remains doubtful
under current law, a would-be publisher of such a tome faces
very little deterrent to publishing and disseminating the book.
As a matter of economic logic, no good reason exists for requir-
ing the victim of a bombing to shoulder the social costs of the
hypothetical book. As noted above, in the absence of the First
Amendment, the question of establishing liability would be rela-
tively easy. But for the First Amendment, tort law would allow
the victims to recover for the social harms associated with the
book.
The question that begs to be asked-and answered-is why
should the First Amendment preclude the application of tradi-
tional tort principles on these facts? How does a book providing
detailed instructions on how to commit an act of terrorism
meaningfully advance the project of democratic self-governance?
Indeed, such information is light-years removed from the good
faith criticism of public officials that lies at the heart of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan'0 9 and its progeny. It makes sense to
protect democratic deliberation from the silencing actions
brought by public officials or public figures against the press.
Protecting good faith criticism-or parody-of public officials and
public figures well-serves core concerns of the First Amendment.
Facilitating the building and detonation of terrorist devices,
however, does not." °
ever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."). Although this Arti-
cle argues that the First Amendment should not bar liability for Harm Advocacy
speech, it does not suggest that it is completely inapplicable. Cf W. Tarver
Roundtree, Jr., Constitutional Law, 33 MERCER L. REv. 51, 63 (1981) (arguing that
cases such as Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 275 S.E.2d 580 (1981), in
which the plaintiff was injured after imitating conduct from the television program
The Mickey Mouse Club, should be resolved under tort law rather than the First
Amendment); Donald Wallis, "Negligent Publishing": Implications for University Pub-
lishers, 9 J.C. & U.L. 209, 225 (1982) (arguing that in spite of the holding in the
Disney case in favor of the publishers, the publishers should realize that the First
Amendments protections may not be available to them in the future).
108. See infra notes 139-61 and accompanying text.
109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Schauer, supra note 11, at 1325-26 (arguing that
"once we uncouple the freedom of speech from the compensation (literally or figura-
tively) of the victim we will see that goals often thought mutually exclusive can be
at least somewhat compatible" (footnote omitted)).
110. It is important to note also that imposing liability for Harm Advocacy is en-
1190
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Because plaintiffs can recover damages for certain speech
activities-that is, fraud, solicitation, and defamation-it is sur-
prising that courts have not acted under their common law pow-
ers to regulate speech that advocates or facilitates the commis-
sion of harms to others. If the First Amendment permits defen-
dants guilty of knowing or reckless misconduct to be held liable
in tort for millions of dollars in damages when their publications
cause injury to reputation, as, in the Sullivan line of cases in-
volving defamation, then the First Amendment also should be
understood to permit parallel liability in tort when publications
cause serious physical injuries or death.
Nevertheless, many courts confronted with cases involving
Harm Advocacy have concluded that such speech enjoys strong
First Amendment protection."' The problem with imposing lia-
bility involves the absence of a direct temporal link between
publication of the Harm Advocacy and a subsequent harmful act,
as well as judicial doubts about the causal connection between
works facilitating harmful acts and the acts themselves.112
II. THE BRANDENBURG TEST AND HARM ADVOCACY
The principal difficulty associated with the recognition of
Harm Advocacy-the potential absence of a temporal
link-stems from a misapplication of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Brandenburg v. Ohio."3 As explained more thoroughly
below, Brandenburg, properly understood, does not address
speech that attempts to facilitate or assist lawless action, but
rather governs abstract exhortations to lawless action that
might incite a sufficiently susceptible person to action. 14 Thus,
tirely viewpoint neutral: the aims or objectives of the publisher are irrelevant to the
question of imposing liability for the social harm resulting from the speech.
111. See infra notes 139-61 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
113. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
114. See id. at 447; see also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024-
25 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a magazine article on autoerotic asphyxiation did not
incite an adolescent to perform the act that led to his death because the article in-
cluded several warnings and the imposition of civil liability would violate the First
Amendment); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 1001 (Ct. App. 1988)
("T]here is nothing in [the] songs which could be characterized as a command to an
immediate suicidal act."); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067,
1191
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Brandenburg speaks only to the specific subject of speech advo-
cating harm, and not to the entire category of speech that this
Article denominates Harm Advocacy.
The absence of a causal link between Harm Advocacy and
actual incidents of harm relates to doubts about the wisdom of
ascribing a cause-effect relationship to "mere speech" or impos-
ing liability for actions that an author or musician might not
have intended or foreseen, or both. These are valid concerns-
the imposition of tort liability on a weak evidentiary standard of
causation would have a profound chilling effect on the arts."5
These concerns can be overcome by requiring proof of subjective
intent and a sufficiently demanding evidentiary standard of
proof for establishing the author's or musician's subjective intent
as well as by requiring significant proof of causation. If an au-
thor or musician seeks to facilitate a harmful act and succeeds
in these efforts, the First Amendment should not provide a
shield from liability.
A. The Brandenburg Clear and Present Danger/Imminence Test
The Supreme Court announced the current general test for
advocacy of lawless action in Brandenburg.116 Clarence
Brandenburg was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) who had
invited the local press to attend a KKK rally." At the rally, he
gave a somewhat incoherent speech in which he proclaimed that
the KKK was "not a revengent organization, but if our Presi-
dent, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress
the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to
be some revengeance taken.""8 As a result of his speech, the
defendant was convicted for advocating criminal activity in vio-
lation of Ohio law."9
1071 (Mass. 1989) (holding that a film depicting gang life did not constitute unpro-
tected incitement because, "[alithough . . . rife with violent scenes, it [did] not at any
point exhort, urge, entreat, solicit, or... encourage unlawful or violent activity... .
115. See infra notes 273-96 and accompanying text.
116. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
117. See id. at 445.
118. Id. at 446.
119. See id. at 444-45. The statute at issue in that case prohibited:
"[A]dvocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
1192
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In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court
revised the "clear and present danger" test.12' The Court recog-
nized that the then predominant clear and present danger test
allowed the government to suppress undesirable political views
simply by invoking the speech's "tendency to lead to violence.""
To ensure greater protection of political speech and less opportu-
nity for government pretext, the Brandenburg Court focused on
whether the speech at issue presented a temporally imminent
danger:
IT]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.122
industrial or political reform" and ... "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any
society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism."
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (repealed 1974)).
120. The Supreme Court of the United States first articulated the clear and pres-
ent danger test in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919): "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 51; see also Whit-
ney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that
speech cannot be restricted under the clear and present danger test unless it "would
produce or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive
evil which the State constitutionally may seek to prevent .. ), overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
The traditional clear and present danger test was relied upon to uphold govern-
ment suppression of political speech on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding conviction of members of Com-
munist Party, which advocated a violent overthrow of the federal government); Whit-
ney, 274 U.S. at 371-72 (upholding conviction of member of state Communist Labor
Party, which advocated criminal syndicalism); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
214-16 (1919) (predicating the conviction for criminal attempt upon the defendant's
advocacy of a criminal act); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919)
(upholding conviction for "conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion"
as violating the Espionage Act of 1917).
121. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam); see Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 447. This concern relates back to cases applying the clear and present dan-
ger test in a relatively weak form. See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507-08. Justice
Douglas so feared a "bad tendencies" understanding of the clear and present danger
test that he rejected the test entirely as being too unreliable in affording protection
to core political speech. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 454 (Douglas, J., concurring).
122. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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The Court emphasized that 'the mere abstract teaching... of
the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action.'" ' Thus, under
Brandenburg, advocacy of violence can be prohibited only when
a speaker (1) advocates imminent illegal conduct; (2) intends to
incite either the use of force or illegal conduct; and (3) is highly
likely to incite such conduct."A The Court did not find that the
words spoken by the Klansman satisfied this test; therefore, the
Ohio statute that purported to punish such speech was itself
unconstitutional.'25
Since Brandenburg, the imminence requirement has become
the central focus of the test. 6 For instance, in Hess v. Indi-
ana,127 the Court reversed the conviction of an antiwar demon-
strator who yelled, "[w]e'll take the fucking street later (or
again)."12' The Court held that this language amounted at most
to the "advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time."' 9 Because the evidence showed that Hess's statement was
simply an emotional exclamation rather than a potentially effec-
tive exhortation to action directed specifically at a particular
group of persons, and because no evidence existed that his state-
ment was intended and likely to produce imminent disorder, the
statement enjoyed constitutional protection1 00
123. Id at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
124. See id. at 447.
125. See id. at 448.
126. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
127. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
128. Id. at 107. Hess made the statement at an antiwar rally while the protesters
were dispersing. See id. The speech clearly advocated an illegal action. See id. at
108. The Court, however, held that although the statement advocated an illegal
action, it advocated such an action at an undefined future date. See id. It was not
an action to be taken in the near future, and thus did not meet the imminence
requirement. See id. at 108-09.
129. Id. at 108.
130. See id. at 107-08. But cf People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968 (Ct. App.
1979) (finding that the offer of $500 to "kill, maim, or seriously injureD" members of
the Nazi party was a solicitation to murder based on the words and the surrounding
circumstances).
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Similarly, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 3' the Su-
preme Court set aside an award of damages based on a NAACP
boycott of white merchants.3 2 In the course of the boycott, one
NAACP official had proclaimed in a public speech that "if we
catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna
break your damn neck."'3 The Court acknowledged the speaker
in question used strong language, but concluded that essentially
the speech was an impassioned plea for support of the boycott."
Nevertheless, if actual outbreaks of violence had followed, the
Court suggested that a substantial question would exist re-
garding whether the speaker could be held liable for the result-
ing damages.3 5 Because the only outbreaks of violence took
place weeks or months later, the Court held that no liability
could attach. 6 Advocates must be free to make spontaneous
emotional appeals without carefully weighing their words, and
such appeals constitute protected speech when they do not im-
mediately incite lawless action.3 7
One should note that none of these cases involve efforts to
teach listeners how to commit specific illegal acts against partic-
ular persons or groups. Neither the Klan, the antiwar protestor,
nor the NAACP was conducting a seminar in how to make and
successfully toss a Molotov cocktail. When speech activity is hy-
perbolic and advocates some ambiguous lawless action and at an
indefinite time in the future, it presents very little real risk to
the community. In the vast majority of cases, the social cost of
such speech activity is de minimis. 3
8
131. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
132. See id. at 902.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 928.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 932.
137. In addition, the Court noted that the speaker tempered his impassioned
rhetoric with the following remarks:
I am not going to lay out in the bushes and shoot no white folks. That's
wrong. I am not gonna go out here and bomb none of them's home....
That's not right ... . Be courteous now. Don't mistreat nobody. Tell
them in a nice forceful way, the curfew is going to be on until they do
what we ask them.
Id. at 939-40.
138. Of course, the effects of hate speech can be very real to members of targeted
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B. The Implications of Brandenburg for Harm Advocacy
The Brandenburg test quite appropriately makes it difficult
for the government to restrict or suppress political speech. That
said, it does not establish an absolute bar to government regula-
tion of speech activity.13 9 Rather, it creates a strong presumption
that the First Amendment protects the mere advocacy of law-
lessness.' ° Although the Brandenburg test clearly recognizes the
government's compelling interest in safeguarding the safety of
citizens, it generally rejects the government's invocation of this
interest when the speech in question involves dissident political
views. Thus, the requirement that the alleged lawlessness
communities. See, e.g., MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993). The First
Amendment's free speech guarantee generally has afforded speakers immunity from
liability for psychological harm, even when a speaker deliberately sets out to bring
about such harm. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978); cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) (holding that protection of liberty as defined by the Due Process
Clause does not prevent punishment of criminal libel directed at certain groups). For
democratic deliberation to occur, some measure of psychological harm to members of
the community must be accepted as a necessary consequence of the project of self-
governance. Legal scholars have hotly contested whether the Supreme Court has
struck an appropriate balance on the question of how much psychological harm must
be tolerated. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND
NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 10-11 (1997);
MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 1041 (arguing that pornography or sexually explicit
materials should not fall within the protective bounds of the First Amendment); cf.
Steven G. Gey, Postmodern Censorship Revisited: A Reply to Richard Delgado, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1082-84 (1998) (arguing against the creation of a "hate speech"
category of unprotected speech). For present purposes, this Article assumes that the
First Amendment precludes relief for harms of the sort described in Beauharnais,
Smith, and Falwell. These harms, although real, are not the result of Harm Advoca-
cy and therefore lie beyond the scope of this Article.
139. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
140. See id.
141. See STEVEN H. SHIFFIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA
10-31 (1999) (arguing that dissent constitutes the First Amendment's central purpose
and that the courts should interpret the Free Speech Clause to encourage and facili-
tate dissent). Another possible explanation is that incitement to imminent lawless-
ness, like fighting words, induces listeners to react impulsively. Under this theory,
regulating such speech therefore would not implicate the listener's autonomy. See
Strauss, supra note 49, at 338-40, 366-68 (arguing that government regulation of
speech that persuades rational decision makers to act violates individual autonomy
and the First Amendment, but that regulation of speech that induces ill-considered
actions is not a deprivation of autonomy).
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take place or be likely to take place almost immediately after
the delivery of the speech ensures that the danger is in fact not
speculative and that the government's interest in preventing the
violence is not pretextual.
Conversely, if speech aims to facilitate a particular lawless act
against a discrete victim or group of victims, the government's
claim of concern sounds far more plausible on its face. Suppress-
ing unpopular political minorities is one thing, preventing the
bombing of federal buildings or abortion clinics is quite another.
In the context of abstract political speech by unpopular political
minorities, Brandenburg's imminence test makes a great deal of
sense. Purely speculative harms are insufficient grounds for
censorship. When the nature of the speech itself creates a pal-
pable danger, however, the government is less concerned with
censorship and more concerned with the viewpoint neutral ca-
dence of the public safety.142 Indeed, two landmark Supreme
Court cases suggest that Brandenburg should not be stretched to
confer blanket protection on Harm Advocacy.'
142. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 734 (1971) (White,
J., concurring) (finding that language on publishing troop transport information is
not protected by the First Amendment and may indeed be subject to a prior re-
straint); see also United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D.
Wis. 1979) (granting a temporary injunction against Progressive magazine to prohibit
publication of an article containing material on how the H-bomb worked). For a fur-
ther discussion of the Progressive case, see generally Erwin Knoll, National Security:
The Ultimate Threat to the First Amendment, 66 MINN. L. REv. 161 (1981); L.A.
Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55 (1990).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 144-56; see also Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 250-51 (1961) (commenting that if the defendant was taught how to
kill a man with a pencil, the spedker's advocacy has crossed the line from the ab-
stract to the concrete and may be proscribed); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If this were a case where those who
claimed protection under the First Amendment were teaching the techniques of sabo-
tage . . . I would have no doubts. The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teach-
ing of methods of terror... should be beyond the pale.... ."); Cass R. Sunstein, Is
Violent Speech a Right?, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 35 (arguing that "narrow
restrictions on speech that expressly advocates illegal, murderous violence in messages
to mass audiences probably should not be taken to offend the First Amendment").
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1. New York Times Co. v. United States
In New York Times Co. v. United States,'" also known as the
Pentagon Papers Case, a majority of the Justices made clear that
the First Amendment allowed the publication of military secrets,
at least when publication of the information probably would not
put service people in immediate harm. 45 Concurring opinions in
the Pentagon Papers Case point the way toward the recognition
of Harm Advocacy as an unprotected subject of speech activity.'
Justice Brennan reaffirmed explicitly that "[nlo one would ques-
tion but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to
its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of
transports or the number and location of troops.'"'47
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'48 the Supreme Court
severely limited the right of individuals to sue publishers in the
event a publication is defamatory. 49 In order to recover damag-
es, a would-be public figure or public officer plaintiff must show
that the media defendant acted with "actual malice," that is,
knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference to truth or falsity. 50
Although the Court recognized that the imposition of tort liability
based on a defendant's speech constitutes state action,' 5' and
144. 403 U.S. 713.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that expression is un-
protected when it "must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of
an event kindred to imperiling the safety [of the military]"); id. at 730 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating that in order for the government to prevent publication, it would
have to show that publication would "surely result in direct, immediate, and irrepa-
rable damage"); id. at 732 (White, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (recognizing
that publication could be enjoined if the government had shown "grave and irrepara-
ble danger").
147. Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
148. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
149. See id. at 265 ("The test is not the form in which state power has been ap-
plied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."). In
Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that "[w]hat a State may not constitutionally
bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil
law of libel," because the fear of civil liability might "be markedly more inhibiting
than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." Id. at 277.
150. See id. at 283-92.
151. See id.; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (noting
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that the imposition of liability may have a chilling effect on the
exercise of free speech, 152 the Court permitted recovery when
actual malice exists because of society's interest in protecting
individuals' reputation from harm, even when individuals volun-
tarily place themselves in the public spotlight." 3
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court effectively constitutionalized
state tort law to prohibit the imposition of civil liability for good
faith criticism of public officials.' In subsequent cases, however,
the Supreme Court has made clear that false speech, as such,
does not enjoy any special First Amendment protection in its
own right.155 Careful consideration of Sullivan and its progeny
56
the "well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news").
152. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring). To achieve protection
of free speech, the Court imposed on public officials a heavy burden of proving actu-
al malice to make it difficult to reach, much less persuade, a jury. If such public
officials could be persuaded not to sue, the media would be spared the cost of de-
fending questionable claims and the corresponding pressure to tone down or even
disregard provocative stories that might spawn litigation. Some commentators believe
that the Sullivan standard is not sufficiently protective of the press and have sug-
gested that such libel cases be barred or made even more difficult to pursue. See,
e.g., David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 435-
36 (1975) (discussing why the Sullivan standard failed to achieve the goal of reduc-
ing defense costs); Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time
to Return to 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603
(1983) (urging absolute immunity should apply at least for published criticism of the
official conduct of public officials); William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limita-
tions on Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solu-
tion," 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 798-809 (1984) (supporting limitations on dam-
age awards in libel cases brought by public officials and public figures).
153. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-92.
154. The Court did not decide whether tort liability, in general, is the kind of
abridgement of speech that requires First Amendment scrutiny. See David A. Ander-
son, Torts, Speech and Contracts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1505 (1997).
155. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas.").
156. See id. at 347 (holding that when the subject of a libelous statement is a
private figure, the defendant's conduct must be at least negligent in order for liability
to be imposed); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (holding that a
public figure must demonstrate that the defendant exercised "highly unreasonable
conduct" such that it constitutes an "extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to" to recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood).
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demonstrates that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment displaces traditional common law tort principles only when
necessary to protect democratic deliberation."' 7 Because Harm
Advocacy does not advance the process of democratic delibera-
tion, it should be deemed outside the scope of the Sullivan rule.
C. Harm Advocacy, the First Amendment, and the Lower
Federal Courts
Based on the Sullivan holding that tort remedies are available
to plaintiffs harmed by certain types of speech, numerous plain-
tiffs have tried to hold publishers liable for their works when
those works incite violence or lawlessness, and thereby cause
harm.'58 Few have prevailed.'59 One major reason is that a ma-
157. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (asserting "a profound national commitment to
thp principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials").
158. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (re-
versing a jury's award of damages in a wrongful death action against a magazine
publisher for an adolescent's death allegedly caused by an article that described the
practice of autoerotic asphyxia); Zamora v. CBS, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (granting a motion to dismiss in a suit involving a fifteen-year-old against
television networks for violent 'programming that allegedly caused him to commit
criminal acts); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989 (Ct. App. 1988) (grant-
ing a motion to dismiss in a wrongful death suit against an Ozzy Ozbourne record
that included the song Suicide Solution, which exhorted suicide); Olivia N. v. NBC,
126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (Ct. App. 1981) (granting a judgment of nonsuit at a negli-
gence trial when the plaintiff conceded that the defendant did not intend its film,
Born Innocent, to incite the unlawful behavior that injured the plaintiff and that the
speech was not incitement under the law); Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 276
S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981) (granting summary judgment in a suit by the parents of a
child partially blinded during an attempt to perform a balloon trick demonstrated on
a Disney television program); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d
1067 (Mass. 1989) (granting summary judgment in a wrongful death action by a
father of a boy slain by someone who had just seen the film The Warriors, which
depicted scenes of gang violence, despite the fact that the perpetrator uttered a line
from the film while committing the homicide); DeFilippo v. NBC, 446 A.2d 1036,
1040 (R.I. 1982) (granting summary judgment in a wrongful death suit brought by
the parents of a deceased minor against NBC after their son hanged himself while
imitating a hanging stunt he observed on The Tonight Show).
159. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (permit-
ting a wrongful death suit against the publisher of Hit Man under Brandenburg's in-
citement standard); Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th
Cir. 1992) (applying the commercial speech doctrine to an advertisement in Soldier
of Fortune magazine that offered a "GUN FOR HIRE .... All jobs considered" and
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jority of the lower federal courts have applied the Brandenburg
test when determining whether a publisher or author who advo-
cates criminal acts should be liable for resulting harm.160 Apply-
ing the Brandenburg test, courts have refused to hold publishers
liable because the incitement was not explicit, warnings were
included, or no "clear and present danger" of imminent injury
existed.16' Although the Brandenburg test properly protects
political speech advocating the overthrow of the government or
other abstract promotion of lawlessness, it has proven to be
overprotective of nonpolitical speech that directly facilitates
physical harm against others.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the standard applicable
to nonpolitical Harm Advocacy speech. Nevertheless, two rela-
tively recent decisions by United States Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have established two very different approaches to claims
that Harm Advocacy enjoys broad First Amendment protection.
1. Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. 162 is one of the few cases
holding that the First Amendment does not pose a bar to a find-
ing of civil liability against a publisher."a The Rice case arose
out of the brutal murders committed by James Perry, a contract
killer." In preparation for these murders, Perry closely followed
permitting a wrongful death suit to proceed); Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Maga-
zine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (same); Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc.,
539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (allowing a wrongful death suit against a radio station
where a promotional contest repeatedly urged and encouraged driving in a dangerous
manner to intercept a disk jockey driving around in a marked car to collect a cash
prize); see also Schauer, supra note 11, at 1343-48 (arguing that victim compensation
for speech-related harms and the protection of free speech are not incompatible
goals).
160. See infra notes 161-223 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 161-223 and accompanying text.
162. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998). For an ,in-
teresting discussion of the background to Rice, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, DELIBERATE
INTENT 6-72 (1999).
163. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 255-65.
164. See id. at 239. Lawrence Horn hired Perry to kill his ex-wife and eight-year-
old quadriplegic son in order to obtain the $2 million awarded to his son in a law-
suit for the accident that caused his son's paralysis. See id. Perry murdered Mildred
Horn, her son Trevor, and Trevor's private duty nurse by shooting the two women
through the eyes and strangling the helpless boy. See id. Perry received the death
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the directions contained in Hit Man: A Technical Manual for
Independent Contractors"' and the second volume of How to
Make Disposable Silencers,166 publications of Paladin Enterprises,
Inc. (Paladin).'67 On discovering the pivotal role that these books
played in the execution of this crime, the victims' families sued
Paladin16 for tortious aiding and abetting. 69
Applying the standard set forth in Brandenburg,70 the district
court granted Paladin's motion for summary judgment, holding
sentence. See Perry v. Maryland, 686 A.2d 274, 276 (Md. 1996).
165. REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
(Paladin Press 1983). The author of the book is actually a woman who has remained
unidentified. See SMOLLA, supra note 162, at 229-35.
166. 2 How TO MAKE DISPOSABLE SILENCERS (Paladin Press 1983).
167. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 239-41. For example, Perry meticulously followed the
books' directions and advice about how to solicit for prospective clients in need of
murder-for-hire services, how to handle and use an AR-7 rifle and drill out the serial
number, how to construct a silencer and shoot at an optimal distance "to insure
quick and sure death," how to disassemble the weapon and change its rifling to
prevent its ballistics from matching the bullets left behind in the victims, how to
make the crime scene look like a burglary, how to dispose of the weapon and any
stolen goods in pieces along the roadway, and how to use a rental car to get away
from the crime scene undetected. Rice, 128 F.3d at 240 (quoting FERAL, supra note
165). If Perry had followed the Hit Man instructions a little more closely, he may
not have ended up in his current predicament. Despite the precautions Perry took to
avoid detection, police placed him in Rockville the day of the murders because he
checked into a motel near the scene using his real name and address. See SMOLLA,
supra note 162, at 23.
168. The families sued Paladin and its president, Peter Lund. See Rice v. Paladin
Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Md. 1996). More than 20 amici curiae filed
briefs at the trial and the appellate level. These amici included media corporations,
the ACLU, the Association of American Publishers, the Newspaper Association of
America, and the Society of Professional Journalists. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 233; 940
F. Supp. at 838.
169. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. The plaintiffs also sought damages based on
theories of negligence and strict liability. See id. The complaint alleged that Paladin
aided and abetted Perry in the commission of these murders through the publication
of its books with their explicit instructions on how to commit and cover-up a con-
tract murder. See id. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals addressed
these arguments.
170. The district court in Rice found that three elements must be met under the
Brandenburg test to prohibit Paladins publication of the manuals. See id. at 845-46.
First, the manuals must have been intended to incite lawless action; second, the
books must have been intended to produce imminent lawless action; third, and last,
the books must have been likely to produce imminent lawless action. See id..Finding
that none of these requirements had been met, the court concluded that Paladin's
speech could not be regulated or prohibited by state tort law. See id. at 847-48.
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that the First Amendment barred recovery of damages. The
district court found that the Paladin publications did not meet
Brandenburg's stringent imminence requirement, as the mur-
ders occurred at least a year after Perry purchased the manu-
als. 7 ' In addition, the district court found that the books al-
though "reprehensible and devoid of any significant redeeming
social value,"172 did not constitute incitement or a call to ac-
tion,173 and that Paladin did not intend for Perry to commit
murder. 74 In granting Paladin's motion for summary judgment,
the court concluded that lilt is simply not acceptable to a free
and democratic society to limit and restrict creativity in order to
avoid dissemination of ideas in artistic speech which may ad-
versely affect emotionally troubled individuals."'75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded.'76 In an opinion written by Judge Mi-
171. See id. at 847.
172. Id. at 849.
173. See id. at 847 ("Nothing in the book says 'go out and commit murder now!').
174. See id. Paladin stipulated that its intent and its marketing strategy were to
attract and assist criminals and would-be criminals who desired information and
instructions on how to commit crimes. See id. The court, however, found it relevant
that Paladin's catalogues and its books included prominent warnings such as "for
academic study only" and a warning stating that certain laws made illegal the pos-
session of particular kinds of guns and accessories as well as stating that it is ille-
gal to manufacture a silencer without a government license. The warning provided:
WARNING: IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO manufacture a silencer
without an appropriate license from the federal government. There are
state and local laws prohibiting the possession of weapons and their
accessories in many areas. Severe penalties are prescribed for violations
of these laws. Neither the author nor the publisher assumes responsi-
bility for the use or misuse of information contained in this book. For
informational purposes only!
Id. at 838-39, 848.
175. Id. at 848-49 (stating specifically that the court declined to create a new cate-
gory of unprotected speech).
176. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997). The court
explained:
Paladin's astonishing stipulations, coupled with the extraordinary compre-
hensiveness, detail, and clarity of Hit Man's instructions for criminal
activity and murder in particular, the boldness of its palpable exhortation
to murder, the alarming power and effectiveness of its peculiar form of
instruction, the notable absence from its text of the kind of ideas for the
protection of which the First Amendment exists, and the book's evident
lack of any even arguably legitimate purpose beyond the promotion and
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chael Luttig, the panel agreed that the Brandenburg standard
applied, but held that the First Amendment was not a bar to
finding Paladin civilly liable as an aider and abetter of Perry's
triple contract murder. 7 The appellate court held that the dis-
trict court had misread Brandenburg78 by failing to recognize
that speech that "is tantamount to legitimately proscribable
nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately proscribed,
punished, or regulated.... ."'7 9 The Fourth Circuit emphasized
that Paladin's speech, because it was so detailed and methodical
in its explanations and instructions on how to plan, commit, and
cover-up the crime of murder, was not abstract speech and
therefore received no First Amendment protection. s
Throughout the opinion, the court repeatedly cited the "aston-
ishing" stipulations by Paladin that it knew criminals would use
its publication.'"' In the court's opinion, these stipulations
teaching of murder, render this case unique in the law. In at least these
circumstances, we are confident that the First Amendment does not erect
the absolute bar to the imposition of civil liability for which Paladin
Press and amici contend.
Id.
177. See id. at 255-65.
178. See id. at 264 ("Wie cannot fault the district court for its confusion over the
opinion in that case. The short per curiam opinion in Brandenburg is, by any mea-
sure, elliptical.").
179. Id. at 243. In support of this, the court looked to two Supreme Court deci-
sions. In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), the Supreme
Court rejected "a First Amendment challenge to an injunction forbidding unionized
distributors from picketing to force an illegal business arrangement." Rice, 128 F.3d
at 243 (citing Giboney). The court next cited Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982),
as a recent example of the Supreme Court's decision not to allow a First Amend-
ment defense simply because the illegal activity takes the form of words. See Rice,
128 F.3d at 243-44.
180. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 256 ("Hit Man is, pure and simple, a step-by-step mur-
der manual, a training book for assassins."). The court further stated that:
[Tihe quintessential speech act of providing step-by-step instructions for
murder . . . so comprehensive and detailed that it is as if the instructor
were literally present with the would-be murderer not only in preparation
and planning, but in the actual commission of, and follow-up to, the
murder [has] not even a hint that the aid was provided in the form of
speech that might constitute abstract advocacy.
Id. at 249.
181. Id. at 241-42 & n.2, 248, 252-53, 256, 266-67 (reviewing Paladin's stipulations
that it intended and had knowledge that criminals would use Hit Man to commit
murder and that it had engaged in a marketing strategy to attract and assist indi-
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proved a level of intent readily satisfying the requirements of
Maryland's civil aiding and abetting statute and the First
Amendment. 8 2
Applying a narrow line of criminal cases"a holding that the
First Amendment does not shield the defendants just because
they used speech to commit crimes, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the First Amendment posed no bar to civil liability as
well.' The court reviewed several cases involving tax protesters
who not only urged violations of the Internal Revenue Code, but
also helped people complete false returns. 8 5 It also noted a
Ninth Circuit case in which the federal government successfully
prosecuted the publisher of drug-manufacturing instructions for
aiding and abetting, citing with approval the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the First Amendment "does not provide publishers
a defense as a matter of law to charges of aiding and abetting a
crime ... .186 Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
viduals in the pursuit of this information). Even without these stipulations, the court
concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Paladin possessed the requisite
intent under Maryland law as well as any heightened First Amendment standard.
See id. at 248.
182. See id. at 250-65. The Fourth Circuit found that the manuals' only commu-
nicative value was the illegitimate one of training persons how to murder and to
engage in the business of murder for hire. See id. at 262-63, 267.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding Brandenburg inapplicable to a conviction for conspiring to transport and
aiding and abetting the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, where
defendants disseminated a computer program that assisted others in recording and
analyzing bets on sporting events because the program was "too instrumental in and
intertwined with the performance of criminal activity to retain first amendment
protection"); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that the First Amendment does not provide publishers a defense as a matter of law
to charges of aiding and abetting a crime through the publication and distribution of
instructions on how to make illegal drugs); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619,
624 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that tax evasion speeches were not subject to
Brandenburg because, although they did not "incite the type of imminent lawless
activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases," they did "go beyond mere advocacy
of tax reform"). But see United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 551-52 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that general statements regarding the unfairness of tax laws, as op-
posed to teaching how to avoid tax laws, may constitute protected speech).
184. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 243-47.
185. See id. at 245-46 (citing United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215, 217 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that the First Amendment offered no protection to speech that was
not abstract in its criticism of tax law, but instead urged people to file false tax
returns, with the expectation that this advice would be heeded)).
186. Id. at 244 (citing United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982)). In
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considerably less authority exists on the subject of whether the
government may subject such speech to civil penalties or make it
subject to private causes of action, 8 1 the court assumed that it
could do so because the government could prosecute the same
speech criminally without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment.'8 '
Barnett, the defendant was the publisher of an instruction manual on how to manu-
facture the illegal drug known as PCP. See Barnett, 667 F.2d at 838-39. Another
person obtained the defendant's instruction manual and was caught in the act of
manufacturing the illegal drugs. See id. at 838. The federal government prosecuted
the defendant for aiding and abetting the manufacture of PCP. See id. at 837. The
defendant argued that evidence seized at the crime scene should be suppressed be-
cause the defendant had a First Amendment right to print the manual. See id. The
court explained that:
To the extent, however, that Barnett appears to contend that he is im-
mune from search or prosecution because he uses the printed word in
encouraging and counseling others in the commission of a crime, we hold
expressly that the First Amendment does not provide a defense as a
matter of law to such conduct.
Id. at 843.
187. Cf Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991) (finding, in a civil
promissory estoppel case, that the First Amendment does not bar liability for a
newspaper's publication of a confidential source's name); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1985) (rejecting a First Amendment de-
fense to a copyright infringement action against a magazine for unauthorized print-
ing of presidential memoir excerpts); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433
U.S. 562, 565-69 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment does not bar liability for
the common law tort of unlawful appropriation of "right to publicity" where a televi-
sion station broadcasted a "human cannonball" act in its entirety without plaintiffs
authorization). Compare Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (applying
the same "actual malice" standard to both criminal libel prosecutions and private
defamation actions), with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (requiring public officials to prove actual malice in civil defamation actions).
188. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 247. The court then identified two possible qualifications
to this conclusion. See id. at 247-50. The first involved a "heightened intent require-
ment" to prevent the punishment or abolishment of innocent and lawfully useful
speech. Id. at 247. The court determined that any such heightened intent require-
ment is satisfied by 'those who would, for profit or other motive, intentionally assist
and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First
Amendment," that is, those with "specific intent." Id. at 248. The second qualification
was that the First Amendment imposed similar limitations on the imposition of civil
liability for abstract advocacy as it would for the imposition of criminal punishment
for the same type of speech. See id. at 248-49. Because the court firmly believed
that Paladin's speech was "so comprehensive and detailed" in its narration and in-
struction on murder that the speech could not be considered abstract advocacy under
any set of facts, the question of qualifying the limits of liability simply was not
presented. Id. at 249.
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The Fourth Circuit's decision seems largely correct on the
facts at bar; the First Amendment should not protect an inten-
tional effort to facilitate a crime. For whatever reasons,
Paladin's officers stipulated that this was their intent in pub-
lishing the two books at issue. Somewhat less convincing, how-
ever, is the court's attempt to fit Brandenburg to these facts.
Brandenburg's imminence requirement mandates difficult, al-
most theological, intellectual acrobatics in order to reach Harm
Advocacy. It would make more sense to simply find
Brandenburg inapplicable to the kind of speech activity at issue
in Rice.
2. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,1 89 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a publisher could not be
held civilly liable for materials that provide instructions on how
to perform a dangerous sex act.1 90 In Herceg, Diane Herceg sued
Hustler magazine after her 14-year-old son, Troy, was found
nude and hanging by his neck in a closet.19' At his feet was a
copy of the magazine opened to an article entitled Orgasm of
Death.'92 The article described in detail the practice of autoerotic
asphyxiation, which "entails masturbation while 'hanging' one-
self in order to temporarily cut off the blood supply to the brain
at the moment of orgasm."' 9 Herceg claimed that the magazine
induced her son to attempt the deadly technique, and she won a
$182,000 jury award against Hustler.9"
Reversing the judgment, the Fifth Circuit held that the Hus-
tler article constituted protected speech under Brandenburg.'95
189. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
190. See id. at 1021.
191. See id. at 1017.
192. See id. at 1019.
193. Id. at 1018. The article was part of an ongoing series exploring the pleasures
and dangers of unusual sexual practices. See id. The purpose of the series was "to
increase [readersl sexual knowledge, to lessen [their] inhibitions and-ultimately-to
make [them] much better loverIs]." Id.
194. See id. at 1019. The plaintiffs presented no evidence that Hustler wanted
people to try this behavior. Also, no evidence existed that Hustler attempted to
reach a 14-year-old audience.
195. See id. at 1021. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' first complaint
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The plaintiffs argued that the article went into unnecessary
detail about how one accomplishes autoerotic asphyxiation.196
Although the court, in an opinion written by Judge Alvin B.
Rubin, found it conceivable that the amount of detail contained
in the challenged speech might in some cases be relevant in
determining whether incitement exists, the court found that the
level of detail in this instance was insufficient to permit the
imposition of liability consistent with the First Amendment.'97
The court expressed doubt that a magazine article that merely
described a harmful act could ever constitute an incitement in
the sense of being "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and... likely to produce such action," the defini-
tion used by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg.'98
The court held that under Brandenburg, the plaintiffs would
have to prove that autoerotic asphyxiation is a lawless act, that
the magazine advocated this act, that the article went beyond
"mere advocacy" and amounted to incitement, and that the in-
citement was directed to imminent action.'99 The court noted
alleging claims of strict liability and negligent publication, contending that the arti-
cle was either an attractive nuisance for which Hustler magazine had a duty of
social responsibility, or that the article was a dangerous instrumentality or a defec-
tive product. See Hereg v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983),
rev'd, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court granted the plaintiffs leave to
amend suggesting that an incitement theory might be maintainable. See id. at 1019.
The case went to trial on an incitement theory, and the plaintiffs won. See Herceg,
814 F.2d at 1019. The court explained that "[tihe crucial element to lowering the
first amendment shield [under an incitement theory] is the imminence of the threat-
ened evil .... [No fair reading of [the article] can make its content advocacy, let
alone incitement to engage in the practice." Id. at 1022-23. In addition, the court
further noted that "[i]ncitement cases usually concern a state effort to punish the
arousal of a crowd to commit a criminal action." Id. at 1023.
196. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023.
197. See id. Autoerotic asphyxiation is evidently not a complicated practice, ob-
served the court, and the article included details of how, given human physiology, it
is a threat to life and poses a serious danger of harm. See id.
198. Id. at 1022.
199. See id. The court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether writ-
ten material might ever be found to create culpable incitement unprotected by the
First Amendment, but it observed generally that the constitutional protection accorded
to the freedom of speech and of the press "is not based on the naive belief that
speech can do no harm, but on the confidence that the benefits society reaps from
the free flow and exchange of ideas outweigh the costs society endures by receiving
reprehensible or dangerous ideas." Id. at 1019. Moreover, the court made note of the
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that the extent of danger created by a publication is potentially
relevant to determining the state's power to sanction the pub-
lisher for the harm that ensues, but explained that the First
Amendment's protection of speech activity does not disappear
simply because the publication of an idea creates a potential
hazard.200 According to the court, whether the magazine article
in this case insinuated a dangerous idea into young Troy
Herceg's head was but one factor in determining whether the
state could impose damages for the consequences.2"' Judge Ru-
bin explained that the danger posed by unclear or diminished
standards of First Amendment protection might both inhibit the
expression of protected ideas by other speakers and constrict the
right of the public to receive those ideas.0 2 Thus, under
Brandenburg, the article enjoyed First Amendment protection.20 3
Despite the fact that the Hustler publication involved nonpo-
litical speech, the court was not persuaded to apply a less strin-
gent standard than the Brandenburg test.20 4 Although acknowl-
edging that political speech is at the core of the First Amend-
ment, according to two of the three judges on the panel, such an
approach "would not only be hopelessly complicated but would
editor's comments that warned readers of the "often-fatal dangers . . . of 'auto-erotic
asphyxia,"' not to attempt it, and that the facts were being presented solely for
educational purposes. Id. at 1018-19 (stating that the two-page article warned read-
ers "at least ten different times" of the dangers incident to the practice).
200. See id. at 1020; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Eloquence may set fire to reason.").
201. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020.
202. See id.
203. At least arguably, the Herceg court failed to ask the correct question. It
should have asked whether Hustler subjectively intended minors to engage in the
described dangerous sexual practice. The answer plainly is no. Hustler may not even
be legally sold to 14-year-olds. It is also doubtful that Hustler wishes to kill off its
subscribers' The article is in poor taste and gross, but it is not Harm Advocacy. The
Rice case is different in this regard. In depositions, Paladin agreed that it intended
to bring about the harm at issue. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233,
241 (4th Cir. 1997). Although these cases involve completely different facts, the re-
sults in both cases are the socially correct result. However, both results reflect rath-
er aggressive (and shameless) manipulations of the Brandenburg test.
204. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024 (holding that because the imminence of the
threatened harm serves as the crucial factor that justifies withholding First Amend-
ment protection from speech, even if an article paints in glowing terms the plea-
sures supposedly achieved by autoerotic asphyxia, no fair reading of it would trans-
form the speech into an incitement to action).
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raise substantial concern that the worthiness of speech might be
judged by majoritarian notions of political and social propriety
and morality."0 5 Concerned about the potential problems with
enforcing a vague standard, the court eschewed an approach
that would determine, postpublication, "that an article discuss-
ing a dangerous idea negligently helped bring about a real
injury" simply because the published "idea can be identified as
bad."20 6
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Edith Jones agreed
with the panel majority's decision to reverse only because the
plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's dismissal of their
negligence claims.0 7 Judge Jones characterized the Hustler arti-
cle as pornography, bordering on obscenity, and, therefore, found
no First Amendment barriers to a negligence claim.2 8 Her anal-
ysis began with an examination of the publication." 9
Disagreeing with the majority's characterization of the task at
hand, Judge Jones argued that First Amendment analysis is an
exercise in line drawing that requires judges to determine where
specific speech falls in the hierarchy of First Amendment juris-
prudence.20 Even if the First Amendment generally protects
205. Id.
206. Id. As Judge Alvin B. Rubin wrote for a divided panel:
Under our Constitution, as the Supreme Court has reminded us "there is
no such thing as a false idea. However, [sic] pernicious an opinion may
seem we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas. ". . . If the shield of the
first amendment can be eliminated by proving after publication that an
article discussing a dangerous idea negligently helped bring about a real
injury simply because the idea can be identified as "bad," all free speech
becomes threatened. An article discussing the nature and danger of
"crack" usage--or of hang-gliding-might lead to liability just as easily.
Id. at 1019, 1024 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)).
207. See id at 1025 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
208. See id. at 1028.
209. See id. at 1026.
210. See id. at 1027. Judge Jones argued:
First Amendment analysis is an exercise in line-drawing between the
legitimate interests of society to regulate itself and the paramount neces-
sity of encouraging the robust and uninhibited flow of debate which is
the life-blood of government by the people. That some of the lines are
blurred or irregular does not, however, prove the majority's proposition
that it would be hopelessly complicated to delineate between protected
and unprotected speech in this case.
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speech activity, the government's interest in preventing the
harm associated with the speech activity must be balanced
against the free speech values at stake.211 The second part of her
analysis entailed an examination of the reasons for protecting
the challenged speech under the First Amendment against the
particular publisher's claim to unlimited constitutional protec-
tion.2' Judge Jones noted that Hustler magazine constituted a
commercial enterprise.213 Therefore, she concluded that the im-
Id.
211. See id. at 1027-29; see also Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212-14 (2d
Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Judge Jones suggested looking to defamation
cases in which recovery of damages is permitted, under less than an actual malice
standard, as "an analogous framework." Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1028 (Jones, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). She cited Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985), in which the Supreme Court balanced the state interest in
that case against the First Amendment interest at stake. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at
1028 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting). For Judge Jones, speech must relate to
a matter of public concern before it merits serious First Amendment protection and
the test of content, form and context articulated in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147-49 (1983), can be employed to determine whether the speech at issue is a mat-
ter of public concern. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1028 (Jones, J., concurring and dis-
senting). Although Judge Jones suggested that matters of private concern should not
go unprotected, she notes that the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet found that
protecting such speech does not outweigh the achievement of important state inter-
ests. See id.
212. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1028-29 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
213. See id. at 1028. Because commercial speech historically has received less pro-
tection than other forms of expressive activity, it may be subjected to a higher de-
gree of government regulation. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
455 (1978) ("We . . . have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protec-
tion, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values."); Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1118-19 (11th
Cir. 1992) (applying the commercial speech doctrine to sustain a wrongful death suit
against Soldier of Fortune arising from an explicit gun for hire advertisement by a
professional mercenary who promised discretion and privacy for "special jobs");
Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (W.D. Ark.
1987) (applying the commercial speech doctrine and permitting a jury damage award
because the plaintiff "is not attempting to have defendant enjoined from exercising
its right to run advertisements" such as the one in question). The courts in these
cases upheld actions for damages against Soldier of Fortune for deaths resulting
from the magazine's "gun for hire" advertisements. The defendants in these cases
tried unsuccessfully to use the First Amendment as a defense. In these cases, the
defendants appeared to lose because the courts determined that the speech involved
was commercial speech, which is afforded limited First Amendment protection. See
Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117; Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1398. But see Eimann v. Soldier
of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that to impose
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position of tort liability would have no chilling effect on Hustler
so long as a market for such literature continues to exist.214 In
this way, Judge Jones likened Hustler magazine to commercial
speech in which state regulation by means of tort recovery is
appropriate when "tailored to specific harm and not broader
than necessary to accomplish its purpose."215
The Herceg majority reached the correct result, but on the
wrong theory. Extending Brandenburg to reach Harm Advocacy
provides more protection than such speech merits under the
First Amendment. If a publisher knowingly seeks to facilitate
conduct that the legislature may constitutionally proscribe, the
speech at issue should itself be proscribable. This is not because
the greater power of prohibiting conduct also encompasses the
lesser power of proscribing speech.216 Rather, it is because
speech that facilitates criminal conduct is itself proscri-
bable-just as conspiracies and solicitations may be criminalized
liability merely because an advertisement could reasonably be interpreted as an offer
to engage in illegal activity would require a publisher the burdensome task of reject-
ing all ambiguous ads). Recently, the Supreme Court appears to have moved toward
treating commercial speech similarly to other forms of protected speech. See Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1930-35 (1999)
(providing protection for gambling advertisements and noting that the government
must demonstrate that the harms it seeks to prevent when regulating commercial
speech are real and that its regulations will alleviate them to a material degree);
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-31 (1993) (striking
down city's regulation of newsracks because it was not content neutral and did not
qualify as a valid time, place and manner restriction of protected speech); see also
William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on
Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640 (1996); Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 651-52 (1990) (ar-
guing for the same level of protection for all categories of speech). This Article does
not argue for the application of the commercial speech doctrine to Harm Advocacy
speech, and does not rely on these cases to support the regulation of Harm Advoca-
cy speech.
214. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1029 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
215. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
216. Cf. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986)
(holding that the power to ban gambling includes the power to ban gambling ad-
vertisements). The Supreme Court has rejected this aspect of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Posadas. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad., 119 S. Ct. at
1929-30 (rejecting the Posadas analysis); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 508-11 (1996) (rejecting dictum in Posadas that the greater power of regu-
lating conduct includes the "lower" power of regulating speech that promotes the
conduct).
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and punished, speech akin to a conspiracy or solicitation can be
punished. Moreover, the proscription is not the product of antip-
athy toward the speaker's ideological motivations, but rather a
prudent preventive measure to protect the public from harm.21
If the majority's opinion is overprotective of Harm Advocacy,
Judge Jones's opinion reflects a rather severe disconnect with
basic First Amendment principles. Hustler magazine is neither
intended for nor legally distributed to fourteen-year-olds; as a
general matter, the state may not reduce the adult population to
material suitable only for children.218 Also, the government may
not attempt to police the boundaries of correct sexual atti-
tudes.219 In this regard, Judge Jones's personal antipathy for the
source of the materials in question appears to have clouded her
legal reasoning.220
Her application of the commercial speech doctrine is also
problematic. Under her approach, the editorial pages of the New
York Times and Washington Post would constitute commercial
speech, a conclusion with little support in Supreme Court prece-
dent.22' Although the subjective intent of the speaker does seem
217. For example, under the Harm Advocacy approach, it does not matter whether
it is Mother Theresa's nuns who publish a manual on how to build bombs, the
World Church of the Creator, or the Black Panthers. All would be responsible for ac-
tions taken as a result of their publication if the requisite intent and procedural
burdens were met.
218. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (reversing the conviction of a man
who attempted to sell a book to a police officer that was deemed to lead to the cor-
ruption of youth); see also Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 127-28 (1989) (explaining that adults' free speech rights may not be restricted
to that which is appropriate for children); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293,
297-98 (1978) (explaining that children are not to be included as part of the "com-
munity" to determine whether a work is obscene).
219. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of S.U.N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89
(1959) (rejecting the New York Education Department's denial of a license for the
public exhibition of a film version of D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterly's Lover).
220. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential"
Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1253-54 (1996) (explaining how
judges sometimes allow their emotional reactions to the facts of a given case to
affect adversely the quality of their legal reasoning); Jessalyn Hershinger, Safety Re-
strictions on Violent Expression: The Impropriety of Extending Obscenity Analysis, 46
VAND. L. REV. 473, 488 (1993) (arguing that the overriding question of the protection
of a work alleged to be "obscene" depends on who defines obscenity).
221. See Bolger v. Young Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-69 (1983) (explaining
that the mere fact that informational pamphlets are mailed by a commercial enter-
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to drive close questions on whether to characterize speech as
"commercial" or "noncommercial," the article at issue in Herceg
does not present a difficult question on this score. Moreover,
even if the article does constitute commercial speech, it still
enjoys substantial First Amendment protection.222 In sum, Judge
Jones's concurrence is a bizarre piece of work that adds little in-
sight into addressing the problem of Harm Advocacy, beyond
perhaps demonstrating the potential dangers and pitfalls associ-
ated with ad hoc adjudication of free speech claims.2"
III. THE DANGERS AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE BRANDENBURG
TEST AS APPLIED TO HARM ADVOCACY
Recent events have underscored the need to develop a new
approach to speech that advocates harm to others. Investigators
in the Oklahoma City bombing prosecution discovered that one
of the bombers, Timothy McVeigh, had a "how to" book by Pala-
din as well as The Turner Diaries in his possession. 2 4 Earlier
this year, a federal jury found that the operators of a web site
that threatened physical harm to many abortion providers and
listed their names and addresses was liable under the Free
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE).225 Moreover, the Anti-
prise does not automatically make them commercial speech, but finding that, in
context, the particular pamphlets at issue constituted commercial speech because the
sender intended to induce sales of its contraceptive products and also included pro-
motional materials for its products with the informational pamphlets); see also Ron-
ad J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children's
Television Programming, 1996 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1211-32 (explaining the importance of
context, including the speaker's subjective intent, in determining whether particular
speech is commercial or noncommercial in nature).
222. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923,
1930-35 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495-97 (1996).
223. At least one commentator, however, sees Judge Jones's ad hoc adjudication of
Harm Advocacy speech claims as preferable to the almost absolute protection provid-
ed by the Brandenburg test. See Terri R. Day, Publications that Incite, Solicit or In-
struct: Publisher Responsibility or Caveat Emptor?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 85-
86 (1995) (arguing that courts should apply a balancing test when speech falls out-
side of defined categories and noting approval for Judge Jones's dissent in the
Herceg case).
224. See James Bone, Murder Manual Firm Pays Out, TIMES (London), May 25,
1999, at 11 (discussing Timothy McVeigh's ownership of a Paladin bomb-making
book).
225. See Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp.
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Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center have
noted a marked increase in hate groups on the internet calling
for violent revolution against the government and advocating
physical violence against the members of various minority
groups.
226
2d 1130, 1154-56 (D. Or. 1999) (granting an injunction under FACE prohibiting the
publication of defendant's website and posters with the intent to threaten the abor-
tion providers and declaring that the court "totally reject[s] the defendants' attempts
to justify their actions as an expression of opinion or as a legitimate and lawful
exercise of free speech in order to dissuade the plaintiffs from providing abortion
services"). In the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices (RICO) claim, Planned
Parenthood and four doctors who perform abortions brought suit against 14 individu-
als and 2 organizations alleging that they had threatened abortion providers through
a series of posters and a website, "the Nuremberg files." See id. at 1131-33. One of
the posters lists by name a "Deadly Dozen" of doctors and highlights an indictment
from the Nuremberg Trials declaring the Nazis who forced abortions on East Euro-
pean and Jewish women were war criminals. See id. at 1131-32. On the website, the
antiabortion organization had a wanted list of 225 doctors and abortion supporters,
providing their addresses, photos, license plate numbers, and, in at least one case,
the names of their children and the schools they attend. See id. at 1132-33. Doctors
who have been killed by alleged pro-lifers were crossed off of the wanted list. See
id. at 1133. Those who merely were wounded were shaded in gray. See id. On Feb-
ruary 2 1999, a federal jury awarded Planned Parenthood, and the other plaintiffs
$109 million in damages. See James C. Goodale, Can Planned Parenthood Silence a
Pro Life Website?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 2, 1999, at 3. Appealing the verdict, the defendants
claimed that they were protected by the First Amendment because they made no
explicit threats. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Extreme Speech on the
Internet, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1999, at 3. For an overview of the verdict and the sur-
rounding controversy, see Goodale, supra, at 3 (discussing the potential harm to the
media resulting from the verdict in the Nuremberg Files case); Roxanne Guillory,
Abortion Rights Supporters Challenge Opponents' Dangerous, Deadly Tactics, NATION-
AL NOW TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 16986169 (presenting the argu-
ments for restricting the anti-abortion speech against the abortion providers).
226. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, YOUTH AT THE EDGE (2000) (discussing
the inroads that organized hate groups are making among white youth in economi-
cally depressed communities); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, EXPLOSION OF HATE: THE
GROWING DANGER OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE (1988) (reporting on growth of hate
groups in the United States and on their increasing use of the internet to attract
followers); Hate Groups on the Rise; Internet Major Factor, Research Finds, JET, Mar.
22, 1999, at 19, available in 1999 WL 9747422 (reporting the statement of Mark
Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center that "[t]he Internet is allowing the White
supremacy movement to reach places it has never reached before-middle and upper
middle class, college-bound teens"); Raymond W. Smith, Civility Without Censorship:
The Ethics of the Internet-Cyberhate, 65 VITAL SPEECHES 196 (Jan. 15, 1999) (re-
porting the statement of the chairman of Bell Atlantic that civil rights groups need
to think of new ways to meet the increasing threat from cyberhate on the internet);
We Love the Net, But We Hate You, NEW MEDIA AGE, July 1, 1999, at 17 (discussing
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In response to the threat from hate groups and the easily
accessible material providing directions on how to commit vari-
ous violent acts, some politicians and commentators have called
for government censorship of such speech. The Department of
Justice, concerned about the proliferation of bomb-making in-
structions on the internet, filed a brief in support of the plain-
tiffs in the Rice case, arguing that Brandenburg should not ap-
ply to protect this speech, and that even if it does, "imminent,"
as used in Brandenburg, does not really mean "imminent."22
Moreover, Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, proposed "The Child Safety and Youth
Violence Prevention Act of 1999" that recommended banning
"obscenely violent materials to minors."228 In addition, a Louisi-
recent report by the Anti-Defamation League stating that hate groups are stepping
up their use of the internet to target young recruits).
227. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBIMAKING INFOR-
MATION 26 (1997) (Feb. 10, 2000) <http:/www.usdog.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
bombmakinginfo.html> ("[W]here it is foreseeable that the publication will be used
for criminal purposes; . . . the Brandenburg requirement that the facilitated crime
be imminent should be of little, if any, relevance."). The Department's position is
somewhat bewildering: If "imminent" does not have a strong temporal connotation,
one is hard pressed to make sense of the Brandenburg opinion--or, for that matter,
subsequent opinions such as Hess and Claiborne. One commonly cited dictionary
defines "imminent" as meaning "likely to happen without delay," "impending," and
"threatening." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 909 (2d 1983). The Departmens position-not unlike the Rice opinion
itself-ignores the core meaning of "imminent" in order to find the Brandenburg test
satisfied. The problem with this approach is that watering down or eliminating the
imminence requirement opens the door to a "bad tendency" interpretation of the
clear and present danger test-an approach that sanctions relatively broad censor-
ship of unpopular political minorities. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
228. H.R. 2037, 106th Cong. (1999) (prohibiting the sale of "extremely sexual or
violent material that is not protected by the First Amendment to minors and im-
posing felony investigations and possible jail terms on retailers of such material if
they sold, loaned, or exhibited sexually explicit or violent material to minors); see al-
so Bill Holland, House Defeats Cultural Legislation, BILLBOARD, June 26, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 10040337 (noting the defeat of Representative Hyde's proposal and
discussing the other statutes still pending to regulate violence on the internet, tele-
vision, and movies); Robert MacMillan, Sen. Hatch Joins Anti-Online Violence Cru-
sade, NEWSBYTES, May 5, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5122026 (discussing proposals
by Senator Hatch to implement more safeguards to protect children from damaging
thoughts and images in popular media, particularly those received over the internet);
Eric Pianin & Juliet Eilperin, House GOP to Split Bill on Violence: Tactic May
Weaken Gun Curbs, Allow Focus on Hollywood, WASH. POST, June 15, 1999, at Al
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ana appellate court recently applied the Rice holding to a case
involving the movie Natural Born Killers and permitted the case
to proceed over the defendant's motion to dismiss.
229
Federal courts' current application of the Brandenburg test to
speech that advocates harm does not strike the proper balance
when the speech at issue advocates lawless behavior in a man-
ner that does not necessarily cause any imminent danger, but
nevertheless poses a grave risk of directly facilitating grossly
antisocial behavior."' For example, in Rice, the Fourth Circuit
had to engage in severe manipulations of the Brandenburg test
to establish liability for books that clearly are far removed from
the type of speech at issue in Brandenburg.23 The Rice court did
(discussing the Hyde Amendment to the Juvenile Crime Bill, which proposed tough
new restrictions on the entertainment industry as a method to control the new wave
of violence among school-aged children and prevent their access to sexual and violent
materials). For a further discussion of the similarity between obscenity and violence,
see KEVIN SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY (1999) (arguing that violence is at
least as obscene as sex and therefore should face similar prohibitions). A recent
article shows just how easily bomb-making materials can be located on the internet.
See Cheryl White, My Son Built a Bomb, LADIES HOME J., Mar. 1, 1997, at 36
(discussing a son's access to an internet site concerning how to build a bomb and
his resulting injuries after he attempted to build and detonate it).
229. See Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the
victims of a convenience store shooting could sue the producers of the film Natural
Born Killers, including Warner Brothers and Oliver Stone, on the grounds that the
perpetrators of the shooting had gone on a crime and shooting spree after seeing the
movie). The suit alleged that the producer of the film knew and intended that the
film would inspire persons to engage in such crimes and violence. See id. at 684-85.
The film's producers sought to have the case dismissed on First Amendment grounds
citing the many "copycat" cases in which television and film producers had success-
fully defeated such suits. See id. at 686-87. The appellate court, however, held the
suit could go forward because the plaintiffs alleged that the producer knew and
intended that the conduct depicted in the movie would be emulated. See id. at 687-
88. The Louisiana court relied heavily on Rice as authority for its ruling. See id. at
690-92.
230. A "how to" guide might not motivate a person to commit a crime, unlike a
fiery speech (e.g., "on to the Bastile!"). Properly understood, Brandenburg's immi-
nence requirement relates to the probable persuasiveness of the speech. Harm Advo-
cacy, on the other hand, is not necessarily meant to persuade, it is meant to assist
or facilitate. The temporal relationship between the distributor of Harm Advocacy
and harm occurring could be quite attenuated. If courts continue to apply
Brandenburg to Harm Advocacy, they either will have to manipulate the imminence
requirement or find the speech protected. The former presents an unacceptable risk
to unpopular political speech that includes abstract calls to arms, the latter imposes
unduly high costs on the victims of Harm Advocacy.
231. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 844-48 (D. Md. 1996),
1218 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1159
not even try, and possibly could not, explain how a book pur-
chased and read more than one year prior to the date when a
reader followed its instructions could be viewed as inciting "im-
minent" lawless action.232 Because the Brandenburg test was
stretched in this manner, publishers and authors now fear that
federal courts have opened the floodgates of liability for works of
fiction.2a Moreover, hyperbolic political speech also seems to be
in danger of losing its protected status.
Clearly, such misapplication of the Brandenburg test under-
mines the protection the First Amendment should provide to
abstract political speech and could easily chill artistic and liter-
ary speech. Yet, the imposition of liability on the facts at issue
in Rice seems appropriate because "society's interest in compen-
sating injured parties [and] the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment"2" should not be incompatible goals.
rev'd, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
232. To satisfy the "imminence" element of the Brandenburg test, one must show
that speech causes (or incites) an unthinking, immediate, and lawless action. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). Only in these situa-
tions is the government permitted to regulate incitement to illegal action because
few other options are available to prevent the lawless action, as there is no time for
reasoned debate. Professor Martin Redish has lodged an interesting and salient ob-
jection to the imminence requirement:
My theoretical objection to the Brandenburg-style "imminence" require-
ment is that it harks back to the "marketplace of ideas" rationale for
protecting unlawful advocacy. For it assumed that so long as there is
sufficient time for rebuttal and reasoned consideration, we can rest as-
sured that "truth" will best "falsity." Only when danger is so "imminent"
that there is not time for response and discussion should suppression be
upheld. As noted above, however, there is simply no basis for the con-
clusion that the opportunity for reasoned response will always defuse un-
lawful advocacy. Requiring imminence in every case in the belief that if
it is not present the advocacy will never lead to harm is theoretically un-
justifiable.
Redish, supra note 60, at 1181. For a further critique of the Brandenburg immi-
nence requirement as applied to "how to" manuals, see GREENAWALT, supra note 20,
at 115.
233. See David G. Savage, Did Hired Killer Go by the Book?, L.A. TIMES, May 7,
1997, at Al (explaining the impact of the "Hit Man" case on all forms of media, in-
cluding authors of murder-mysteries).
234. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840. On May 21, 1999, the Rice case settled. Paladin's
insurance company agreed to a multimillion dollar compensation payment to the
families. See Calvin Reid, Paladin Press Pays Millions to Settle 'Hit Man" Case,
PUB. WKLY, May 31, 1999, at 22, available in LEXIS News Group File, All. Paladin
20001 RECALIBRATING THE COST OF HARM ADVOCACY
The Herceg court's reasoning is similarly unsatisfactory. The
Fifth Circuit correctly held that, under the Brandenburg test,
Hustler could not be held liable for the actions of an unforeseen,
unsolicited minor copycat. The court's failure to examine the
content of the specific speech involved, however, led it to em-
brace a potentially overprotective standard for Harm Advocacy.
Government regulation of the narrow category of speech that
concerns detailed instructions on how to commit criminal or
tortious acts ought to be considered presumptively constitutional.
Like other "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech"! 5 that are not accorded First Amendment protection,
such as obscenity and incitement to imminent lawless action,
23 6
this category of speech only minimally implicates the values at
the heart of the First Amendment.
Because Harm Advocacy speech usually consists of highly
technical instructional details, it has little, if any, expressive
value, and because it not only advocates, but also directly facili-
tates the commission of crimes and intentional torts, it has little
if any, politically or socially redeeming value. As a category of
speech, therefore, it is particularly dangerous and not particularly
valuable. More importantly, like other categories of unprotected
speech, this category is likely to result in severe harms to inno-
cent third parties."7 The state clearly has a very strong interest
also agreed to take the Hit Man book off the market. See SMOLLA, supra note 162,
at 272.
235. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (upholding
a zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult movie theaters, and endorsing
the principle that "it is manifest that society's interest in protecting [non-obscene,
sexually explicit speech] is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the in-
terest in untrammeled political debate . .. "); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (upholding a conviction for uttering "fighting words" to a law
enforcement officer); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (ITihis Court has long recognized that not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance.'"); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
49 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance similar to that in Young); Paul B. Stephan
II, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 246-49
(1982) (noting that the Court has never embraced a rule of absolute content neutral-
ity because that would deny the government the power to distinguish speech falling
within the ambit of the First Amendment from that falling without).
236. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49 (permitting government regulation of
speech directed at inciting imminent violence and likely to produce such violence).
237. See Redish, supra note 60, at 1176 ("If a speaker so intends, advocacy which
1219
1220 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1159
in safeguarding the lives of its citizens. 8 In the general calculus
of competing interests, the government's interest in protecting
the lives and limbs of its citizens outweighs whatever slight
social value inheres in such speech. Additionally, the risk that
the government will suppress unpopular viewpoints or cultural
minorities is, at best, remote.
IV. TOWARDS A THEORY OF CIVIL LIABILrrY
FOR HARM ADVOCACY
A. The Need for a New Exception for Harm Advocacy
To better balance society's interest in protecting its citizens
from criminal activities, federal courts should create a new cate-
gory of speech falling outside the protection of the Free Speech
Clause. 39 This speech category would encompass the narrow
does not 'directly' urge unlawful conduct may nevertheless be 'directed' to bringing
about such conduct."). But see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 111 (1973) (holding
that "[w]e'll take the fucking street later" is not advocating imminent lawlessness be-
cause action on the suggestion would probably not occur for an indefinite period of
time and might never occur).
238. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Pubrg Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (noting that
the state may not punish publication of lawfully obtained truthful information "ab-
sent a need to further a state interest of the highest order"); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972) (noting that the government has a compelling interest in
securing the safety of the persons and property of citizens); Herceg v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) ("The interest in protecting life is recognized specifically for first amendment
purposes and, analytically, can be no less important than the interest in reputa-
tion .... [Plrotect[ing] society from loss of life and limb, [is] a legitimate, indeed
compelling, state interest.").
239. See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645,
739 (suggesting that any "approach to criminal prohibitions that gives adequate
protection to speech must be categorical" (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to
Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied
to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 939-42 (1968))). Professor Greenawalt suggests cate-
gorizing speech by the type of utterance: "ordinary expressions of fact and value"
warranting a high level of protection, "utterances that are strongly situation altering,
which are unprotected; and action-inducing encouragements" warranting an interme-
diate level of protection. Id. at 741. The level of protection afforded the speech var-
ies with the type of utterance, whether it was said in public or private, and whether
it is ideological. See id. at 741. As Professor Greenawalt recognizes, however, some
purely factual utterances are worth regulating, such as speech concerning how to
make a bomb or the location of troops. See id.; see also David Crump, Camouflaged
Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the
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spectrum of expression that both advocates and facilitates illegal
or tortious activities against others: Harm Advocacy speech. To
establish that speech activity constitutes Harm Advocacy, the
plaintiff would need to show that the author of the speech either
knew or acted with reckless disregard as to whether recipients
of the speech might act on that author's detailed suggestions on
how to commit a particular unlawful or tortious act and that the
speech at issue actually caused or was a substantial factor in the
commission of a criminal act or intentional tort.240 Additionally,
courts should require a reasonably protective evidentiary
standard of proof for establishing the intent of the author, that
is a would-be plaintiff should be required to meet a clear and
convincing evidence burden of proof; a lesser evidentiary stan-
dard would have an unduly chilling effect on authors and musi-
cians. Thus, a would-be plaintiff not only must establish fore-
knowledge of the potential for the speech to cause harm, but
must do so convincingly. Authors and musicians should receive
more than a mere benefit of the doubt. If an injured would-be
plaintiff can meet the necessary intent, causation, and evidentiary
requirements, then her tort action could proceed through the
court system.
Restricting Harm Advocacy speech still might implicate cer-
tain First Amendment values like speaker and listener autonomy,
Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 48 (1994) ("It was precisely because
Brandenburg used the 'categorical' or 'unprotected utterance' approach that it im-
proved protection for the freedom of speech over the excessively loose balancing in
cases such as Dennis." (footnote omitted)); Frederick Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and the
First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 164-66 (1990) [hereinafter Schauer,
Mrs. Palgrat] (arguing that instructional speech falls outside the First Amendment
protections). See generally Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment:
A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 307 (1981) (recognizing that until
'judges, prosecutors, and legislators become familiar with the full import and com-
plexity of first amendment theory ..... general categories are the most important
way we have of incorporating the constitutionally mandated preference for free
speech values into a legal system populated by human beings of less than perfect
ability and less than perfect insight").
240. This standard is quite similar to the "actual malice" standard of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Just as the author of false speech
should be taxed with its costs when she knows of its falsity, or acts with reckless
indifference to its falsity, so too an author who knows or should know that particu-
lar speech will facilitate or assist in the commission of a criminal act should be
responsible for damage associated with those putting the information to its intended
purpose.
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but the state's interest in protecting the lives of citizens out-
weighs whatever value inheres in permitting access to detailed
information about criminal methods." The adoption of this new
category would implicate none of the major concerns of
Brandenburg and its progeny. Moreover, little danger exists that
the state's invocation of harm or lawlessness would be a pretext
for quashing political dissent. As with the imminence standard
in Brandenburg, this category would require that the gov-
ernment's reason for restricting speech activity actually relate to
protecting citizens from real-not imagined-harms, and not the
suppression of open and robust public debate.
Harm Advocacy simply constitutes speech once-removed from
a crime.242 For example, suppose that an unscrupulous person
called elderly persons seeking to sell them time-share arrange-
ments in Florida, but misrepresented material terms and condi-
tions such that the solicitation constituted criminal fraud.243
Conveying the fraudulent offer entails speech activity, but no
serious person would suggest that the fraud enjoys protection
under the Free Speech Clause merely because speech is a neces-
sary component of the crime.2
Now, suppose that an expert scam artist, tiring of doing his
own dirty work, pens a monograph entitled How to Scam the
241. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at 115 (arguing that "considerations of
autonomy matter, and the autonomy of speaker and of audience are reasons to per-
mit encouragement to crime, but they are reasons to be considered in relation to
other reasons, not absolutely decisive counters in favor of liberty"). But see Shaman,
supra note 71, at 299-300, 340-41 (arguing that speech should be regulated based on
the harm that it causes, not because of its value to society).
242. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, under a concert of action prin-
ciple, recognizes a doctrine similar to criminal aiding and abetting. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). An actor is liable for harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another "if he . . . knows that the other's con-
duct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement
to the other . . . " Id. § 876(b). The concept of tortious aiding and abetting has
arisen frequently in the evaluation of secondary liability for securities law violations,
principally in the area of fraud. See Greenawalt, supra note 239, at 655-56; Theresa
J. Pulley Radwan, How Imminent Is Imminent?: The Imminent Danger Test Applied
to Murder Manuals, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 60-64 (1997) (arguing that al-
though publishers cannot be held criminally liable, they should be held civilly liable
based on their intent).
243. See 18 U.S.C0k § 2326 (Supp. 1999) (telemarketing fraud statute).
244. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing criminal liability
based on speech activities); see also GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at 115.
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Elderly for Fun And Profit. The book does nothing more than
provide detailed directions for operating a telemarketing scam
targeting vulnerable elderly persons, and provides a convenient
appendix giving a list of communities with high concentrations
of potential victims. The author of such a tome does not intend
to participate directly in the commission of the crime, but does
intend to facilitate or assist in the commission of fraud by others
and the book, properly deployed, could constitute a substantial
factor in causing someone to be defrauded. The author undoubt-
edly would claim that the book constitutes protected speech, but
such a claim is meritless. In First Amendment terms, the book,
taken as a whole, contributes nothing of value to the market-
place of ideas; the book does not possess any serious redeeming
political, literary, scientific, economic, or philosophical value. It
neither facilitates democratic deliberation, nor informs consum-
ers about lawful products or services. The book is, quite simply,
utterly without any social value. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to see why the state should be constitutionally power-
less to suppress such speech, for suppressing such speech would
not bring about any of the harms that the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment seeks to forestall.245
Brandenburg is not an appropriate vehicle for analyzing Harm
Advocacy because Brandenburg arises on facts involving core
political speech.2' 6 The First Amendment protects political advo-
cacy most strongly, for such advocacy lies at the center of the
free speech guarantee.247 Moreover, the speech at issue in
Brandenburg does not constitute Harm Advocacy. To be sure,
245. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (holding that the central impor-
tance of the First Amendment is to protect "speech on public issues"); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that free
speech is necessary to ensure governmental accountability to the people, and that it
is protected by the First Amendment to prohibit government tyranny); G. Sidiey Bu-
chanan, Toward a Unified Theory of Governmental Power to Regulate Protected
Speech, 18 CONN. L. REV. 531, 533 (1986) (stating that speech on public issues is
"at the core of protected speech").
246. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
247. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982) (holding
that speech protesting racial discrimination constitutes political speech lying at the
core of the First Amendment); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (holding
that expression on public issues "has always rested on the highest rung of the hier-
archy of First Amendment values"); supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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the Klan wished ill-will towards certain members of the commu-
nity and advocated a radical program of state-imposed apart-
heid.248 The speakers even made generalized threats against
those whom they despised ("revengeance"). 249 The speakers did
not provide any direction on how to go about committing assault
or murder; nothing in the speech at issue would facilitate directly
the commission of a social harm that the legislature has the
power to prohibit.25 ° In such circumstances, speech can be regu-
lated only when the generalized threats and calls to action are
likely to bring about an immediate breach of the peace; in other
words, to persuade listeners to act immediately and unlawfully.25'
Harm Advocacy does not refer to speech merely advocating harm
to others or speech that attempts to persuade an audience that
harm to others is desirable in the abstract; rather, it refers to
speech that directly facilitates harm to others.
For example, Harm Advocacy speech would not include speech
that abstractly advocates ideas that some would view as harmful,
for instance, Theodore Kaczynski's "Tract Against Modernity."25 2
In this essay, the author sets forth a theoretical commitment to
revolution against modern technology. If people read his tract
and determine that he is correct and resolve to take up Old
Order Amish existences, 2 3 some might view this outcome as
harmful to society because of the resulting loss of efficiency and
productivity. Nevertheless, the First Amendment's Free Speech
248. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-57.
249. See id. at 446.
250. See SMOLLA, supra note 162, at 131 ("If in Brandenburg itself the record had
demonstrated that the leaders of the Ku Klux Klan rally did more than burn cross-
es and spout racist venom, but actually distributed material such as maps, dia-
grams, chemical formulas for bombs, travel arrangements, instruction on weapons
selection, and specific killing techniques surely that would have crossed the line
from mere abstract advocacy to specific training and preparation.").
251. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that
the statement "[w]e'll take the fucking street later," is not an incitement to immi-
nent lawlessness because "it amounted to nothing more that advocacy of illegal ac-
tion" at some indefinite time in the future).
252. See Unabomber's Manifesto (visited Mar. 2, 2000) <http'/www.soci.niu.edul-crit
crim/uni/uni.txt>; see also Frank Bruni, With a Family Discovery, a Manhunt Comes
to an End, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1995, at B1 (identifying Theodore Kaczynski as the
Unabomber, an individual who had mailed bombs to individuals engaged in high
tech employment and who mysteriously evaded law enforcement officials for decades).
253. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Clause clearly protects such speech.2" Political advocacy might
lead to disruptive change: "If in the long run the beliefs ex-
pressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted
by the dominant forces of the community," the First Amendment
requires "that they should be given their chance and have their
way." 255 "Eloquence may set fire to reason"256 and the nation
might go astray. The First Amendment requires the community
to bear the cost of political change, including speech activity es-
sential to the process of democratic deliberation.
On the other hand, if Theodore Kaczynski instead were to
publish a book providing specific instructions on how to make
small bombs and plant them anonymously, and someone fol-
lowed his instructions and injured another person, the speech
would be quite different in nature and the government should be
able to deter it through tort law. This speech arguably consti-
tutes Harm Advocacy speech, rather than political speech. It is
speech that both advocates and facilitates social harms, that is,
solicitation of illegal acts that cause physical harm to others, the
author intends that his work serve such a purpose, and the work
could serve as a substantial factor in causing such harm. On the
other hand, democratic deliberation does not benefit from a
pamphlet about how to build bombs. The absence of rules has
led to the underdeterrence of Harm Advocacy, a situation that
cries out for change.
Harm Advocacy is akin to a loaded gun or a bottle of poison. 57
It is malum in se, bad in itself. This is not a function of its ideo-
logical or social content, but rather stems from its relationship
254. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969) (holding that "in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression").
255. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
257. See SMOLLA, supra note 162, at 39. One of the plaintiffs lawyers in Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc., described his reaction to reading Hit Man as follows:
I didn't even want to touch the damn book. I couldn't leave it on the
night table-I had to take it back to my office in the house and lock it
in my briefcase. It didn't even seem like it was a book at all, really. It
was more like someone had sent me a loaded pistol, or a vial of poison.
The physical thing had a stench of evil to it.
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to a social harm that the legislature has the constitutional au-
thority to prevent or punish. Speech that does nothing more
than facilitate a socially harmful act should not enjoy any First
Amendment protection.258
Just as obscene speech is "outside" the free speech guarantee
of the First Amendment, so too Harm Advocacy stands outside
the realm of protected speech.259 Simply put, there is no reason
to impose the cost of such speech on the general public given the
utter lack of any countervailing social benefit. This is the calcu-
lus that underlies the Supreme Court's refusal to afford obscenity
or child pornography First Amendment protection.260 The same
rationale should apply to the category of speech denominated as
Harm Advocacy.
B. The Limited Nature of Harm Advocacy Doctrine
It bears noting that Harm Advocacy is a very limited subset of
speech activity.26' It should not encompass any work that, taken
as a whole, possesses serious artistic, literary, scientific, politi-
cal, or philosophical value. Moreover, it should not encompass
speech activity, that the author does not intend to facilitate so-
cial harm or which, objectively analyzed, could not realistically
be viewed as a substantial factor in causing harm.2" Because of
258. Of course, the legislature could not pick or choose from among the motivations
that lead a speaker to engage in Harm Advocacy. See RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 388-96 (1992). That said, a general law proscribing Harm Advocacy should
not be deemed constitutionally infirm.
259. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
260. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-86.
261. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth
Circuit noted that its holding should not worry other publishers because,
In only the rarest case, as here where the publisher has stipulated in
almost taunting defiance that it intended to assist murderers and other
criminals, will there be evidence extraneous to the speech itself that
would support a finding of the requisite intent.
Id. at 265. The court further explained "surely few will, as Paladin has, 'stand up
and proclaim to the world that because they are publishers they have a unique
constitutional right to aid and abet murder.'" Id. at 265-66. But see Byers v.
Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1998) (holding that victims of a convenience
store shooting could sue the producers of Natural Born Killers, including Warner
Brothers and Oliver Stone).
262. See supra notes 239-60 and accompanying text.
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the potential chilling effect that recognition of Harm Advocacy
as a subcategory of speech activity might have on legitimate
speech activity-just as obscenity undoubtedly chills certain
forms of erotic speech-the burden should be on the government,
or plaintiff,2 3 to establish that particular speech activity consti-
tutes Harm Advocacy, including both objective evidence of the
subjective intent of the author 2" and proof of causation.265
The author of a book constituting Harm Advocacy might argue
that it assists law enforcement in identifying the modus operandi
of a thief; a "how to" manual might have some value for law
enforcement, much as a guide to magic demonstrates how to
accomplish a particular illusion through smoke and mirrors.
This argument is not utterly without merit, but it seems incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's approach to both obscenity and
child pornography. That some hypothesized social benefit might
be associated with otherwise harmful speech is not usually a
sufficient condition to render the speech protected, particularly
when the speech activity directly caused obvious social harms.
263. Under Sullivan and its progeny, the Supreme Court has required that libel
law conform to the constitutional requirements of free speech by increasing the lia-
bility standards and by shifting the burdens of proof and the presumptions from the
defendants to the plaintiffs. See, eg., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (shifting the burden of proving falsity on matter of public
concern in speech cases involving private figures from defendant to the plaintiff);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring a public
official to demonstrate that a defendant acted with "actual malice" in order to recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood related to the official's duties). Likewise, under
a Harm Advocacy approach, once the plaintiff presented a tort claim, the defendant
would assert a First Amendment defense, at which point the plaintiff would be re-
quired to bear the burden of proof to show that the defendant published its article,
book or movie with the purpose or knowledge that it would harm others. For a
fuller discussion of the intent requirement under Harm Advocacy, see infra notes
273-83 and accompanying text.
264. Subjective intent is no stranger to the law. Criminal laws require prosecutors
to establish the element of subjective intent all the time, the crime of murder in the
first degree being perhaps the most obvious. The intent of the defendant is also
significant in tax law. The fact that intent may be difficult to prove does not pre-
clude its inclusion in the creation of a new subcategory of unprotected speech activity.
In the First Amendment area, "pandering" cases already rely on subjective intent, as
do commercial speech cases. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463 (1966).
265. See infra notes 284-96 and accompanying text.
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Thus, although it might be the case that married couples might
learn a new trick or two from an obscene film, this potential
pedagogic value does not remove the film from the unprotected
status of obscenity; that nude depictions of children might have
artistic merit or scientific value does not lead to First Amend-
ment protection."' Speech is not protected simply because it is
speech. Rather, speech is protected because it furthers, in some
articulable way, the underlying objectives of the First Amend-
ment.267 As defined in this Article, Harm Advocacy does not
merit protection because it does not serve any meaningful First
Amendment values.268
C. The Importance and Nature of Intent in Limiting the Scope of
Harm Advocacy
Some might object that the recognition of Harm Advocacy
would unduly chill speech or lead down a slippery slope to gen-
eralized programs of government censorship. 9 The element of
intent should forestall this parade of horribles. Indeed, recogni-
tion of Harm Advocacy should actually increase the universe of
protected speech and would eliminate the uncertainty currently
inherent in post-Rice law.
266. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
267. Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (distinguishing obscene from
nonobscene material in part on the basis of "whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408
U.S. 229, 231 (1972) ("A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not
constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication."); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v.
McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 136-71 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that court must treat mag-
azines in question as separate work to be taken as a whole, and should not examine
each separate article or pictorial representation to determine its First Amendment
protection).
268. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Quality of First Amendment Speech, 20
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 275 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court has been
reviewing implicitly the quality of speech when deciding what level of protection it
should receive and that the Court should acknowledge this). But see Shaman, supra
note 71, at 295 (arguing for a harm-based theory of regulation of speech).
269. See Redish, supra note 60, at 1178 ("Only a danger of true harm justifies cur-
tailing the flow of free and open discourse. Continued substitution of a finding of
intent for a showing of a genuine threat to society would cause people to censor
their thoughts and words."). Professor Redish expresses concern that a court or jury
will substitute a finding of the speaker's intent to bring about unlawful conduct for
a showing of danger that the harm would actually come about. See id.
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Although the content of the speech is important in establish-
ing the intent necessary to determine whether speech consti-
tutes Harm Advocacy, a reviewing court also must consider the
context.. in which the author disseminated the speech.27' When
a publisher distributes materials that are highly specific in de-
tailing how to commit a crime, it is difficult to imagine that the
publisher did not intend or know that such a crime indeed might
be committed.272 When one combines a sufficiently demanding
270. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The question whether a
specific act of communication is protected by the First Amendment always requires
some consideration of both its content and its context."). Moreover, in the defamation
context, proof of actual malice generally consists of the prepublication information
possessed by the defendant, the nature and quality of its sources, and the subjective
intent of the defendant. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-75 (1979) (holding
that inquiry into the publication process to prove malice is permissible under First
Amendment). Similarly, in the Harm Advocacy context, the plaintiff would set forth
information concerning not only the intent of the author, but how the author mar-
keted the publication to the public and to whom it marketed the publication. See
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that Paladin
had marketed and sold Hit Man in a manner to appeal to criminals); see also
Crump, supra note 239, at 6 (arguing for a reinterpretation of the Brandenburg test
that focuses on the meanings of language as well as its context).
271. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)
("[Tihe line between permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or
violence depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on
exactly what the speaker had to say."); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 915-16 n. 50 (1982) ("[Tihe question is one of alleged trespass across 'the line
between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be
regulated' .... In cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'exam-
ine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they
were made to see . . .whether they are of a character which the principles of the
First Amendment .. .protect.'" (citations omitted)). As the Fifth Circuit recognized
in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), "it is conceivable
that, in some instances, the amount of detail contained in challenged speech may be
relevant in determining whether incitement exists . . . ." Id. at 1023. The Herceg
court, however, rejected the argument that the amount of detail in the article de-
scribing autoerotic asphyxiation was sufficient to constitute incitement under the cir-
cumstances. See id.
272. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (considering both the
content of Watts words as well as the circumstances surrounding Watt's speech,
including such factors as Watts speech taking place at political rally, the nature of
the threat being conditional, and the crowd responding with laughter, to support
holding that his speech deserved protection); see also McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202
Cal. App. 3d 989, 1000-01 (Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing the songwriter's intent under a
rational inference test, taking into account both the content and the context of the
lyrics). See generally Anne K Hilker, Note, Tort Liability of the Media for Audience
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level of intent with the likelihood of occurrence and the gravity
of the harm requirements, it becomes reasonable for the law to
tax the social costs of Harm Advocacy speech against the speaker.
1. Defining Intent
Degrees of intent, or mens rea, are perhaps most comprehen-
sively considered in the context of criminal law, where they are
divided into various categories, from purposeful through negli-
gent.73 The distinction between each level is critical, for differ-
ent crimes require different levels of intent. 74 For Harm Advocacy
Acts of Violence: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 556-57 (1979)
(examining the potential for media liability for audience violence).
273. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(a) (1985). The most specific form of intent re-
quired often is referred to as "purposeful" intent. An act is done purposely, as de-
fined by the Model Penal Code, when "it is [the actor's] conscious object to engage
in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and . . . he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist." Id. The fi-
nal two standards of intent, recklessness and negligence, are more lenient levels of
culpability not involving an intent for the harm to occur or a knowledge that it is
likely to occur. See id. Rather, they involve awareness of a potential risk. Given the
high value that society places on free speech, it would be difficult to accept a le-
nient intent standard, such as negligence or recklessness, in prohibiting speech. In-
deed, the fear created by such low standards for imposing liability could lead to the
incidental suppression of valuable speech by people who wish to avoid potential
liability for their messages. But see Weirum v RKO Gen., Inc. 539 P.2d 36, 40-42
(Cal. 1975) (imposing liability on a broadcaster under what was essentially a negli-
gence standard for urging listeners to act in an inherently dangerous manner); Lars
Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for Defective Information
in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1205-27 (1998) (arguing that in some circumstances,
publishers and authors should be held strictly liable for errors in their works). Thus,
this Article advocates a relatively high evidentiary standard-clear and convincing
evidence of the defendant's subjective intent-when imposing civil liability for the ef-
fects of Harm Advocacy. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 554-58
(1993) (holding that RICO provisions are not overbroad and do not have a chilling
effect); Redish, supra note 60, at 1165 (discussing possibility that people would cen-
sor innocent speech in order to avoid possible prosecution for advocacy of illegal act).
But see Gerald R. Smith, Note, Media Liability for Physical Injury Resulting from
the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1219-32 (1988) (urging that
courts adopt traditional negligence approach when evaluating physical injury caused
by speech).
274. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2). Harm Advocacy speech is much like solici-
tation as defined by the Model Penal Code: "A person is guilty of solicitation to
commit a crime if. . . he commands, encourages, or requests another person to en-
gage in specific conduct that would constitute such crime . . . ." Id. § 5.02. For
example, in the Rice case, the Hit Man book was essentially an open solicitation to
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speech, the publisher must know that others who plan to com-
mit illegal acts will use his speech. The Model Penal Code de-
fines knowing actions as those in which the actor "is aware that
his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist;
and.., he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
will cause such a result."2 '5 At the time of publication or broad-
cast, the publisher must specifically desire to cause the resulting
harm and must hope that circumstances can be created such
that the harm will ensue or prove grossly indifferent to the
known risk of the harm associated with the work at issue.276
Under this level of intent, the issue begins to blur with the fac-
tual issue of the likelihood of harm that will result.277
To determine a publisher's intent, courts should apply well-
known principles of defamation law. Under current First
individuals interested in pursuing a life of crime. See also Greenawalt, supra note
239, at 657-70 (discussing the danger to society from those who solicit criminal acts
and the variety of intent requirements under the Model Penal Code and state laws).
275. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
276. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (defining actual
malice as action "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not"). In Sullivan, the Court eschewed the common law's
understanding of presumed malice as a proxy for the defendant's intent to harm the
plaintiff. Thus, evidence of the Times's failure to retract and the Alabama court's
conclusion of "bad faith" from testimony at trial was irrelevant because such evi-
dence did not reflect on the defendant's attitude toward truth "at the time of the
publication." Id at 286. Similarly, the presence in the Times's files of information
contradicting the accuracy of the advertisement did not prove that the people re-
sponsible for the publication of the advertisement knew it contained some relatively
minor false assertions. This approach demonstrates that, for the Supreme Court,
malice is a function of the defendant's attitude toward the truth of the publication
rather than of the defendant's awareness of the effect of the publication on the
plaintiffs reputation.
277. In other words, the greater the likelihood of harm, the more likely that the
publisher knew of the results. See Greenawalt, supra note 239, at 657 (stating that
"It]he person who urges another to commit a criminal act has a criminal intent and
has manifested a certain degree of dangerousness"). Thus, the analysis is similar for
both the factual issue (likelihood of harm) and the legal issue (knowledge). See Unit-
ed States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 190 n.42 (D.C. 1976).
278. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (holding that recov-
ery of presumed or punitive damages in defamation suits by private individuals
must be based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth, although actual damages may be recovered on a lesser showing of fault);
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268 (holding that public officials must show actual malice in
order to recover for defamatory statements).
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Amendment principles, courts already have experience determin-
ing the subjective intent of the author to identify the level of
First Amendment protection. 9 The commercial speech doctrine
requires that courts ascertain the intent of a work's author in
order to classify properly the speech. 2" For example, Andy
Warhol's soup cans do not constitute commercial speech, but
rather are a form of artistic expression.28' On the other hand,
the distinctive and attractive label and original advertising cam-
paign to promote Campbell's soups, designed and executed by
acclaimed American artist Norman Rockwell, constitute com-
mercial speech because of the subjective intent of the company
in distributing Rockwell's art.2 2 Hence the characterization of
the speech as "commercial" or "noncommercial" depends on the
speaker's intent in disseminating the message.2"
2. The Causation Requirement
The requirement that a plaintiff establish causation provides
another significant limitation on the potential scope of the Harm
Advocacy doctrine. In order to recover in tort, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's behavior actually played a significant
role in bringing about the harm that injured the plaintiff. In tort
law, causation consists of both cause-in-fact and proximate
cause.2" Cause-in-fact may be determined by either a "but-for"
279. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (stating
that the court conducts an independent review of the record to determine the nature
of the speech in question); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959) (characterizing movie's portrayal of adultery as
advocacy in determining whether such portrayals fall within First Amendment defini-
tion of protected speech); Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D.
Md. 1995) (explaining that the court must analyze the character of the words used
in order to determine the First Amendment status of the speech activity), rev'd on
other grounds, 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997).
280. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding unconsti-
tutional a sweeping prohibition of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements); Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding that a ban on only commercial leaflets
in downtown streets does not infringe upon free speech when one side of the leaflet
is commercial speech and the other side is a protest against governmental action,
when the protest was added with the intent of evading the city ordinance).
281. See Krotoszynski, supra note 221, at 1217.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 1211-26.
284. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 114 (2000) (discussing the elements
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standard2 5 or a less restrictive "substantial factor" standard.286
Proximate or legal cause determines the appropriate scope of the
defendant's liability on practical or social policy grounds.8 7 Ap-
of a negligence cause of action, including cause-in-fact and proximate cause).
285. "Under the but-for test, the defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the
plaintiff's harm if, but-for the defendants conduct, that harm would not have oc-
curred." Id. § 168, at 409. To decide whether the conduct was a but-for cause of the
harm, the jury must compare what actually occurred with what probably would have
occurred absent the allegedly bad conduct. See id. at 409-410.
286. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965) provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not
a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would
have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.
(2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negli-
gence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of
itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence
may be held by the jury to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432. The substantial factor test alleviates the
harsh effect of a plaintiff being unable to recover when two competing causes, either
sufficient to bring about the harm, combine to create a risk, as, for example, when
two speeding cars both strike a pedestrian. See DOBBS, supra note 284, § 171, at
415 (noting further that courts rely on the substantial factor test or no causal test
at all "when causal issues are embarrassing.") The substantial factor test also elimi-
nates liability for acts with inconsequential effects, as, for example, throwing a lighted
match on a forest fire. See id. at 415. Legal scholars have hotly debated the precise
scope of the substantial factor test. Compare David W. Robertson, The Common
Sense of Cause In Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1997) (arguing that the sub-
stantial factor test has been expanded to include cases where causation is difficult
and not just to cases where two causes result in one injury), with Richard Wright,
Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof" Pruning the
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (1988) (arguing that
the causation element should be satisfied if an event is a necessary element of a set
of events sufficient to produce the harm).
287. See DOBBS, supra note 284, § 180, at 443 ("The central goal of the proximate
cause requirement is to limit the defendant's liability to the kinds of harms he
risked by his negligent conduct."); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103
(N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is
that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not
logic. It is practical politics."); see also Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf, supra note 239, at
166 (arguing that not all communicative acts implicate First Amendment concerns,
and that when such concerns are absent, tort actions should be permitted). For ex-
ample, the passage of time or other attenuating circumstances may preclude recov-
ery. See, e.g., City of Brady v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1968) (explaining
that a time lapse may be considered as a factor relating to proximate cause). But
see Stephenson v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 252 N.E.2d 366, 370-73 (IMI. App. Ct.
1969) (holding that as a result of injury caused by the defendant, the plaintiff suf-
fered a second injury five years later); see also In re Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman
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plying causation standards-and more specifically-cause-in-fact
standards to Harm Advocacy will make it unlikely that a plain-
tiff will prevail against a defendant unless strong evidence es-
tablishes a causal connection between the speech and the injury.
Words and ideas can be influential and persuasive. People
learn from ideas, come to believe them, and take actions on the
basis of the ideas they accept. In this sense, ideas cause action
in a "but for" or "substantial factor" manner. Whether the publi-
cation or broadcast is either a but-for cause or a substantial
factor may be particularly difficult to determine in some con-
texts, especially for what may be termed generic crimes or copy-
cat crimes. In these cases, cause-in-fact will serve as protection
against suits in which the defendant's publication or broadcast
merely influenced an already predisposed person to duplicate
the act.288 Thus, causation will be more difficult to assess in a
case such as Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,8 9 in
which injury results from imitation of a depiction of general
conduct (gang violence offered as entertainment), than in cases
such as Rice29° or Herceg291 in which injury results from specific
instructions on performance of the conduct. In such instances,
Transit Co. (Kinsman I), 338 F.2d 708, 711-13 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding proximate
cause when a ship caused great damages after breaking loose from moorings); In re
Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman II), 388 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (refusing to
award damages to grain companies because claims were too remote).
288. In a case such as McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988),
a wrongful death suit against the Ozzy Ozbourne record that included the song Sui-
cide Solution, which exhorted suicide, the determination of cause-in-fact would re-
quire the jury to consider whether the material was a but-for cause or a substantial
factor. The defendant could possibly establish that the information about suicide was
readily available, the victim was seeking it, and it was only fortuity that the victim
relied on the defendant's material rather than another source. Defendant might ar-
gue, therefore, that the record had no substantial effect, like throwing a cup of wa-
ter into a flooded river. See supra note 286.
289. 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (granting summary judgment in a wrongful
death action by the father of a boy slain by someone who had just seen the film
The Warriors, which depicted scenes of gang violence, despite the fact that the per-
petrator uttered a line from the film while committing the homicide).
290. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
291. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987). See Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf, supra note 239, at
166 (arguing that pure instructional speech should not receive First Amendment
protection); Schauer, supra note 11, at 1345 (arguing that in the Herceg case, "there
was probably sufficient probable cause, reasonable for(elseeability, and negligence to
permit recovery under existing tort law").
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expert testimony on the influence of speech on human behavior
may assist the court in determining cause-in-fact.292
That is not to say, however, that causation will always be
lacking in Harm Advocacy suits. For example, in Rice, the police
officers located a Paladin catalog advertising Hit Man among the
hired killer's belongings, and later discovered that the killer had
ordered the book.293 In addition, the prosecutor could show the
many factual similarities between the killings and the detailed
instructions provided in the manual.2" Likewise in Herceg, the
Hustler magazine article was found at the boy's feet after he had
attempted to engage in autoerotic asphyxia.295 In such cases, the
causal inference is direct, not circumstantial, and the defen-
dant's publication may be viewed as cause-in-fact of the
individual's injury. Even so, the fact remains that the nature of
the materials alone (no matter how irresponsible), would not be
sufficient to establish liability in the absence of proof (direct or
inferential) that the materials constituted a "substantial fac-
tor"296 in bringing about the events causing harm to the plaintiff.
In this fashion, then, proof of causation provides another impor-
tant check on the potential scope of liability for Harm Advocacy.
292. There is a great debate over the effectiveness of speech-and whether mere
speech is capable of causing violent harmful behavior. See, eg., UNIVERSITY OF
CAL., SANTA BARBARA ET AL., 2 NATIONAL TELEVISION VIOLENCE STUDY (Center for
Communication & Social Policy & University of California, Santa Barbara eds.,
1998); Haejung Paik & George Comstock, The Effects of Television Violence on Anti-
iocial Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 21 COMM. RES. 516 (1994). If speech does not
cause changes in behavior, there can be no proximate cause relationship. As is often
the case when determination of an issue depends on expert testimony, the evidence
may be contradictory. Compare 1 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, TELEVI-
SION AND BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
EIGHTIES 6 (1982) (reporting general consensus among researchers on causal connec-
tion between television and acts of violence), with John Walsh, Wide World of Re-
ports, 220 SCI. 804 (1983), available in 1983 WL 2005028 (reporting television
networks' critique of NIMH study).
293. See Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 215 (Ct. App. 1996); see also SMOLLA, supra
note 162, at 65-67 (discussing the prosecution's use of Hit Man manual in James
Perry's (the hired hit man's) criminal trial and noting that the manual relieved
Perry of having to do any independent thinking in planning the murders).
294. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 239-41 (listing page after page of similarities between
the murder and Hit Man).
295. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1018.
296. See supra note 286.
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3. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
The intent and causation requirements will be strengthened,
of course, by the higher evidentiary burden described earlier.297
In numerous contexts, including defamation, the Supreme Court
has stated that the First Amendment entitles the defendant to a
clear and convincing evidence standard on basic elements of the
plaintiffs prima facie case.2"8 For example, the public figure or
public official plaintiff must establish reckless falsehood by the
clear and convincing evidence standard.299 Establishing clear and
convincing evidence that an author intended to bring about
social harm substantially limits the potential bite of Harm Advo-
cacy. Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that the First
Amendment entitles a speaker to an independent examination of
a court or jury determination that the speech is subject to regu-
lation.300
297. See supra note 286; supra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding
that under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a public figure libel
plaintiff moving for summary judgment must produce clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice); Bose v. Consumers' Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1983) (stating that
trial and appellate judges may not simply offer instructions and leave to juries the
resolution of constitutional fact); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-
86 (1964) (holding that state defamation law violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments unless it required all public official plaintiffs to establish with "convinc-
ing clarity" that defendants had acted with actual malice).
299. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). Compare id. at 348-
50 (restricting defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard for the truth to actual damages), with Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 67 (1964) (imposing same requirements in prosecution for criminal libel as for
civil libel), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reason-
able doubt to satisfy due process in criminal cases).
300. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (apply-
ing the independent review standard to deny the plaintiff recovery for a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 ("[Wlhere the
First Amendment mandates a 'clear and convincing' [evidence] standard, the trial
judge in disposing of a directed verdict motion should consider whether a reasonable
factfinder could conclude, for example, that the plaintiff had shown actual malice
with convincing clarity."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394-96 (1967) (striking
the jury's award to the plaintiff in an invasion of privacy case on the ground that
the jury had not been charged regarding the actual malice standard); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59-61 (1965) (applying independent review to obscenity case
law).
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4. Most Creative Works Do Not Meet the Intent Requirement
Harm Advocacy does not run afoul of the Supreme Court's
decision in Simon & Schuster v. New York Crimes Board,3 1
which held that autobiographical works involving criminal activ-
ity enjoy substantial First Amendment protection.0 2 Merely
describing a criminal act, whether in a work of fiction 3 . or non-
fiction does not per se constitute Harm Advocacy. The element of
intent drives this result.3 ° In the "copycat" context, it rarely will
be the case that a broadcaster or publisher actually intends,
through its description or depiction of antisocial conduct, to
facilitate similar acts by others .3 0 5 A literary work presenting
crime would not constitute Harm Advocacy unless the author in-
tended to facilitate copycats and the work, objectively viewed,
facilitated future criminal activity.0 6 Additionally, not only will
a political, informational, educational, entertainment, or other
301. 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that New Yorles "Son of Sam" law violated the
First Amendment because it singled out speech on crime for unfavorable treatment).
302. See id. at 123.
303. See, e.g., TRUMAN CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD (1965).
304. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) ("The First Amend-
ment.., does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements
of a crime or to prove motive or intent."); cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
299 (1961) (holding that the defendant must be judged upon the evidence presented
at his own trial, not on the evidence in another trial or on the tenets of the Com-
munist party).
305. Of course, with few, if any, exceptions, the speech that gives rise to the copy-
cat crime will not directly and affirmatively promote the harmful conduct, even if, in
some circumstances, it incidentally glamorizes and thereby indirectly promotes such
conduct.
306. Many cases have been brought involving violent movies and television pro-
grams that were alleged to have caused physical injury or death. The programs
involved in these cases featured graphic depictions of violence that plaintiffs alleged
the defendants initiated. See, e.g., Zamora v. CBS, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla.
1979); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989). For
example, in Yakubowicz, a father, whose son was killed by a minor who had attended
a showing of the film The Warriors, brought a wrongful death action against the dis-
tributor of the movie, Paramount Pictures. See id- at 1068. The court, ruling for the
defendants on a motion for summary judgment, explained: "Although the film is rife
with violent scenes, it does not at any point exhort, urge, entreat, solicit, or overtly
advocate or encourage unlawful or violent activity on the part of viewers. It does not
create the likelihood of inciting or producing 'imminent lawless action' that would
strip the film of First Amendment protection." Id. at 1071 (citing Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
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wholly legitimate purpose for the description or depiction be de-
monstrably apparent, but the description or depiction of the
criminality will be of such a character that an inference of im-
permissible intent on the part of the producer or publisher
would be unwarranted as a matter of law. For almost any broad-
cast, book, movie, or song that one can imagine, an inference of
unlawful motive from the description or depiction of particular
criminal conduct therein would almost never be reasonable, for
not only will there be, and demonstrably so, a legitimate and
lawful purpose for these communications, but the contexts in
which the descriptions or depictions appear will themselves
negate a finding of purpose on the part of the author, producer,
or publisher to assist others in their undertaking of the described
or depicted conduct."' Almost all works in the crime genre
would pass this test with ease.
°8
Likewise, news reporting, no matter how explicit in nature,
will almost never constitute Harm Advocacy. In context, it will
be self-evident that news reporting does not directly assist or
facilitate socially harmful conduct and, even in circumstances
when it arguably does, the reporter's and publisher's intent in
distributing the information would not be to aid or facilitate
potential copycats.
5. The Contemporary Federal Courts Can Properly Administer
the Harm Advocacy Doctrine
Under the current First Amendment analysis, courts must
identify the type of speech involved in a given case and then
307. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting
that the author's specific purpose to assist and encourage the commission of a crime
is important to a finding of criminal and civil liability).
308. See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY (1996). In this novel, Grisham
presents a litany of crimes, most notably including jury tampering, extortion, and
breaking and entering. Grisham's intent in penning The Runaway Jury, objectively
viewed, was not to facilitate jury tampering or other criminal activity. Moreover, the
book is not a particularly useful tool in accomplishing these objectives, unless the
would-be criminal is rather desperate to get caught. By way of contrast, a mono-
graph entitled "How to Intimidate a Juror" with descriptions of how to make a juror
fearful and, hence, receptive to a client's position, would constitute Harm Advocacy if
the author intended to assist or facilitate jury tampering and the material, objectively
viewed, was a substantial causative factor in accomplishing this goal.
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determine the level of protection that the speech merits.30 9 This
content-specific approach arguably increases judicial discretion,
and thus increases the likelihood of unfair or arbitrary results."' 0
Recognition of a new category of unprotected speech activity
called Harm Advocacy will require that courts determine the
precise nature of the speech at issue and establish a "tolerable"
level of instruction."1 A judge's particular sensitivities may well
determine the level of First Amendment protection a publisher's
speech receives. Accordingly, the implementation of this ap-
proach will result in some publishers believing that their speech
rights have been denied or circumscribed unfairly.
In the Harm Advocacy context, however, judicial discretion
should not lead to significantly increased government censor-
ship. The approach proposed in this Article creates an additional
speech category in the hierarchy of speech rights."s Judges can
utilize this new speech category to evaluate claims from plain-
tiffs injured by Harm Advocacy speech, preventing further mis-
application of the Brandenburg test.13 The alternative. appears
to be continued reliance on Brandenburg, a test ill-suited to
Harm Advocacy. Continued reliance on Brandenburg probably
would lead to greater uncertainty about the protected status of a
309. See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
310. See Lawrence C. George, King Solomon's Judgment: Expressing Principles of
Discretion and Feedback in Legal Rules and Reasoning, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1549,
1559-66, 1573-75 (1979); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History,
100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1524, 1538-39 (1991).
311. For example, the recent situation involving the World Church of the Creator,
a racist organization that owns and operates a sophisticated website designed to
attract members, comes close to the line, but neither advocates violence against
minorities nor attempts to instruct visitors on how to accomplish acts of violence
against minorities. See John Cloud, Is Hate on the Rise?, TIME, July 19, 1999, at 33.
312. See generally VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 38, at 21-49 (describing and distin-
guishing the various categories of speech activity carved out by the Supreme Court).
313. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449-52 (1985) (arguing that context is an important element of
contemporary First Amendment analysis); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating
Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411,
1424, 1438 (1995) (arguing that consideration of context is essential to applying the
First Amendment properly); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three R: Re-
pression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV.
119, 151-54 (1995) (arguing that the failure of courts to consider the context of stu-
dent speech has led to underprotection of that speech).
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larger universe of speech activity than the approach advocated
in this Article. 14 Thus, application of a more content and con-
text-specific analysis would not greatly increase the category of un-
protected speech, but instead, would provide a higher degree of
protection for speech that does not constitute Harm Advocacy.31 5
Although this task is not an easy one, and creates the possibility
of an arbitrary characterization of speech (and perhaps an im-
proper denial of First Amendment protection in individual cases),
the benefits of providing greater protection to artistic expressive
activity more than compensate for this opportunity cost.1 6
Courts applying existing First Amendment jurisprudence
applicable to other forms of speech--commercial speech or ob-
scenity for instance-exercise a similar kind of discretion when
deciding how to classify particular kinds of speech.317 If any-
thing, the existing Brandenburg standard is more troublesome,
because it overprotects certain types of speech, potentially caus-
ing confusion about how much speech ultimately will be protected
once the reviewing court finishes its temporal manipulations. 18
314. See infra notes 261-68 and accompanying text.
315. See Greenawalt, supra note 239, at 739 n.364 (stating that although categor-
ical balancing does not eliminate judicial uncertainty about borderline cases, "it does
constrain and focus the range of choice, affording more predictability about many
cases, and gives judges a basis for invalidation other than a determination that the
political branches have not wisely balanced competing interests on a particular occa-
sion"). Professor Freund also stated:
No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase "clear and present danger,"
or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the
weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when
what is most certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of free-
doms, which the judge must disentangle.
PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1951).
316. As Professor Ely argues, "One doesn't have to be much of a lawyer to recog-
nize that even the clearest verbal formula can be manipulated. But it's a very bad
lawyer who supposes that manipulability and infinite manipulability are the same
thing." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DISTRUSm A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
112 (1980).
317. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 38, at 47-49.
318. Of course, this test only establishes a presumption that instructional speech
about how to commit violent felonies is unprotected. When instructional speech has
significant political value, the presumption may be overcome. For example, the
speech in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979),
involving the publication of an article about building hydrogen bombs, might have
warranted more First Amendment protection than was actually extended to it be-
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The Harm Advocacy approach would not necessarily provide a
different result from the use of the Brandenburg standard in
some cases. For example, under this approach, a court probably
would reach the same result in the Rice case with respect to the
"how to commit a murder" guidance.31 9 The facts at issue in Rice
satisfied the intent and probable effect (or causation) compo-
nents of the Harm Advocacy test. Even though the same result
would obtain on the facts at issue in Rice, the use of the Harm
Advocacy test would lead to less uncertainty regarding facts less
extreme than in Rice, thereby providing a greater margin of
protection for artistic, literary, and musical expression.
D. Harm Advocacy Is Viewpoint Neutral
A number of academics have suggested that content-specific
First Amendment tests might lead to viewpoint discrimina-
tion. 2' For example, Professor Tribe warns that "all attempts to
create content-based subcategories entail at least some risk that
government will in fact be discriminating against disfavored
points of view."321
cause its principal purpose was to "alert the people of this country to the false illu-
sion of security created by the government's futile efforts at secrecy." Id. at 994.
This case, however, is distinguishable from Rice not just in terms of the political
nature of the messages. Unlike Rice, Progressive was a prior-restraint case, and
therefore required the government to prove the likelihood of direct, immediate, and
irreparable injury to national security. See id. at 1000. Furthermore, the Progressive
court found that the article in question did not "provide a 'do-it yourself' guide for
the hydrogen bomb." Id. at 993.
319. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 235-39 (4th Cir. 1997).
320. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1980) (noting that courts
should not attempt to differentiate the value of particular messages); Karst, supra
note 58, at 20-21 (arguing that treating all forms of speech equally is central to the
First Amendment).
321. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSrITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18 (2d ed. 1988)
(commenting further that "a] hierarchy of ever-proliferating intermediate categories
requires the Court to assign relative values to different classes of expression, a task
that is all but impossible to reconcile with 'the basic theory of the First
Amendment"). Judge Jones's dissent in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d
1017 (5th Cir. 1987), presents one potential example of viewpoint discrimination.
Judge Jones argued that states should be allowed, under certain circumstances, to
impose liability on pornographers for harm directly caused by the pornography. See
id. at 1025-30.
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The content-specific approach advocated in this Article does
not sanction subjective decisions by judges based on ideological
factors. 2 ' An important distinction exists between viewpoint
discrimination and content discrimination." Viewpoint discrimi-
nation involves the government choosing one side of an issue,
promoting this position, and prohibiting discussion of alternative
points of view. Government attempts at viewpoint discrim-
ination are particularly evil because they prevent a full, fair,
and open debate on a given issue."s
322. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that to justify
a restriction of symbolic speech, the state interest need be no more than "substan-
tial" or "important," but also requiring that the state interest be wholly unrelated to
suppression of the speaker's viewpoint). In O'Brien, the Court upheld a regulation
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards because the regulation was aimed at eradi-
cating a certain behavior regardless of the motivation or speech content. See id. The
O'Brien analysis demonstrates that regulations can prohibit conduct, while not violat-
ing viewpoint neutrality requirements of the First Amendment. Likewise, Harm
Advocacy is aimed at punishing conduct, not speech.
323. A number of scholars who favor a hierarchical approach to free speech pro-
tection have attempted to limit the criticism against content-based regulation to
viewpoint discrimination. Under their theories, distinctions based on the subject
matter or form of speech would not trigger close judicial scrutiny, absent evidence
that the government was taking sides by favoring one viewpoint over another. See,
e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist
View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 735 (1980) (noting that viewpoint-based discrimination is
clearly more troublesome than subject-matter discrimination); Geoffrey R& Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 81, 111 (1978) (arguing that all viewpoints must
compete equally in the marketplace of ideas). But see Martin H. Redish, The Content
Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 128 (1981) (arguing
that there appear to be no good rationales for treating content-neutral regulations
differently from content-based regulations).
324. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11
(1969) (holding that a public school prohibition against wearing black armbands to
protest American involvement in Vietnam, in absence of a prohibition against wear-
ing other controversial political symbols, was an unconstitutional viewpoint restric-
tion); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978) ("'[Albove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.' " (quoting Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at
26-27; Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.").
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A content-specific approach to interpreting the First Amend-
ment, however, does not have the effect of limiting the scope or
ferocity of debate. 25 All viewpoints may compete equally in the
marketplace of ideas. Thus, content analysis involves the
application of a hierarchy of speech values based on the na-
ture-but not the viewpoint-of the speech activity in question,
as part of a judicial effort to ensure that speech receives the ap-
propriate level of First Amendment protection. 7 As a practical
matter, this means that varying levels of scrutiny must be ap-
plied to different kinds of speech. 28 A content-specific approach
does not necessarily imply viewpoint discrimination; reviewing
courts should accord all speech within a particular category the
same measure of protection.
CONCLUSION
When speech poses a significant public danger, the social
value of that speech may not be sufficient to overcome the dan-
ger. Indeed, the state has a strong interest in preventing speech
that will cause a crime, particularly those crimes involving seri-
ous bodily injury or death. Because of the value that society
places on the freedom of speech, however, the tests developed to
avoid government censorship of the speech activities of unpopu-
lar minorities properly place a high burden on the government
to justify imposing liability for the consequences of speech ac-
tivity. Nevertheless, a high burden in theory should not prove to
be an insurmountable burden in practice. 29
325. Cf Kozinski & Banner, supra note 213, at 627 (arguing for a unitary ap-
proach to the First Amendments Free Speech Clause in which all speech activity
would receive equal degrees of protection).
326. See Stone, supra note 323, at 108.
327. See id.
328. See Redish, supra note 323, at 120.
329.
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both the practice
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups
in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disquali-
fied from acting in response to it.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
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Recent events demonstrate conclusively the need for govern-
ment to impose some of the costs of Harm Advocacy on those
who propagate it. The victims of those who use directions inten-
ded to facilitate harm should not be denied a meaningful remedy
on the theory that the First Amendment privileges the scribb-
lings of a de facto accomplice before the fact. When cases arise
that meet reasonably speech-protective standards of liability,
courts must be willing and able to impose liability.
The goal of this Article is not to provide a complete and self-
contained program for dealing with Harm Advocacy speech.
Rather, it presents a theory that potentially provides guidance
to judges and legislators struggling to address the social harms
caused by Harm Advocacy in a fashion consistent with the First
Amendment. Simply put, legal responses to Harm Advocacy that
impose accountability for the consequences of such speech activity
can be squared with First Amendment principles. Application of
traditional tort principles under an evidentiary standard shaped
by First Amendment concerns provides one means of re-
sponding to Harm Advocacy. Undoubtedly there are other po-
tential responses to Harm Advocacy-responses that would be
equally constitutional.330 The purpose of this Article has been to
identify a new category of speech activity especially deserving of
government regulation and to offer a theory under which such
regulation could be squared with traditional free speech values.
Plainly, full implementation of the Harm Advocacy doctrine will
require additional scholarly and judicial attention.
For example, it might be appropriate to permit the govern-
ment to seek the suppression of Harm Advocacy after its distri-
bution, but before it actually facilitates a concrete harm. Simi-
larly, prior restraints against the initial publication or distribu-
tion of Harm Advocacy might be justifiable.3 ' Permitting tort
relief is an entirely reactive approach, limited to compensating
the victims of Harm Advocacy after-the-fact. One could reason-
ably ask whether more aggressive responses to Harm Advocacy
are either necessary or constitutionally appropriate.
U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff still may succeed even under the clear
and convincing evidence standard).
330. See supra notes 36-105 and accompanying text.
331. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 731 (1971) (White,
J., concurring).
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2000] RECALIBRATING THE COST OF HARM ADVOCACY
In Gertz, Justice Powell observed that "[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."3 2 Harm
Advocacy is not the presentation of a false idea, but rather an
integral part of a tort. Just as the First Amendment does not
privilege absolutely the publication of known falsehoods,3S the
federal courts should not construe it to prevent the imposition of
liability for speech that intentionally facilitates harm to others.
As Justice Holmes admonished in Schenck, "the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." 33
The imposition of civil liability for Harm Advocacy simply takes
into account the character of a new and particularly problematic
form of expression. Just as "[t]he most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic,""3 5 the most stringent protection of
free speech should not protect the author of a book on how to
commit arson.
332. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
333. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
334. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
335. Id.
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